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DOES PROVIDING ACCURATE INFORMATION ABOUT SLOT  
MACHINES ALTER HOW PARTICIPANTS PLAY THEM? 
 
Jeffrey N. Weatherly and Ellen Meier 
University of North Dakota
 
It is a commonly held belief that irrational thoughts held by gamblers can pro-
mote gambling behavior and ultimately pathological gambling.  Some evidence 
exists to support this view, but little experimental work demonstrates that con-
fronting these beliefs will lead to a decrease in gambling behavior.  Eighteen 
non-pathological participants were given the option to play a slot machine for 
money.  After gambling in two sessions, they were given accurate information 
about the independence of turns programmed by a slot machine, the negative 
rate of return of a slot machine over time, or both.  Participants were then given 
the option to gamble in two subsequent sessions.  Results showed that the intro-
duction of the accurate information significantly decreased gambling, but did 
not eliminate it.  Furthermore, no significant differences were observed across 
groups that received the different types of information.  The results support the 
idea that gambling behavior is at least partially rule governed, but also indicate 
that information alone is unlikely to get individuals to stop gambling. 
Keywords: Rule-governed behavior; Slot Machine; Gambling 
 
____________________ 
 
 Within the United States, gambling is a 
very popular activity.  Nearly every state has 
some form of legalized gambling (MacLin, 
Dixon, & Hayes, 1999) and estimates suggest 
that over 90% of the population will engage 
in some type of gambling behavior within 
their lifetime (Petry, 2005).  Although this 
behavior can be entertaining, it leads to se-
rious problems for some.  Petry (2005), for 
instance, estimated that between 1 – 3% of the 
population suffers from pathological gam-
bling. 
Although the percentage of individuals 
who suffer from gambling problems is quite 
small compared to the percentage of individu-
als who gamble without such problems, the 
absolute number of people who suffer from 
___________ 
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pathological gambling is not.  Given the large 
number of people who suffer, it behooves the 
field to try to determine why these individuals 
come to display problem behavior (while oth-
er gamblers do not).  The research literature 
on gambling is relatively large, suggesting 
that researchers have not ignored the study of 
gambling.  However, no universally accepted 
explanation of pathological gambling current-
ly exists (see Petry, 2005 for a review). 
 Perhaps the most popular approach to 
understanding and treating pathological gam-
bling currently comes from the cognitive 
perspective.  This approach espouses that pa-
thological gamblers operate under false or 
faulty beliefs that lead them down the road to 
pathology (e.g., see Ladouceur, Sylvain, Bou-
tin, & Doucet, 2002).  These fallacious 
thought patterns can include the illusion of 
control (i.e., the idea that the person’s actions 
influence the outcome of the game when in 
fact they do not; Langer, 1975), the failure to 
understand the independence of outcomes 
(i.e., the fact that, in most games of chance, 
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the outcome of any one play is independent of 
the outcome of the previous or subsequent 
play), and the failure to recognize the games’ 
negative rate of return (i.e., nearly every game 
of chance programs a long-term rate of return 
below 100%, meaning that the longer one 
plays, the more likely it becomes that one will 
lose money).  Theoretically, people who op-
erate under these fallacies are prone to be-
come pathological gamblers.  To successfully 
treat that pathology, one must eliminate or 
alter these fallacious thoughts. 
 From a behavior-analytic perspective, the 
underlying assumption of this view is that 
gambling behavior is largely rule governed.  
Although behavior analysis has long treated 
gambling behavior as being under the control 
of contingency-driven factors (see Weatherly 
& Dixon, 2007 for a discussion), an increas-
ing number of behavior analysts are suggest-
ing that verbal behavior plays a key role in the 
maintenance of gambling behavior (e.g., Di-
xon & Delaney, 2006; Dymond & Whelan, 
2007; Weatherly & Dixon, 2007).  This view 
has some support.  For instance, Dixon (2000) 
was able to demonstrate that the behavior of 
roulette players could be altered by the intro-
duction of inaccurate instructions even after 
the players had come into contact with the 
programmed contingencies of the game.  Di-
xon, Hayes, and Aban (2000) demonstrated 
that the best predictor of when participants 
ceased gambling was the instructions the par-
ticipants were provided, not the outcomes 
(e.g., winning or losing) the participants expe-
rienced while playing.  More recently, Dere-
vensky, Gupta, and Baboushkin (2007) were 
able to demonstrate that different winning 
contingencies altered children’s’ reported 
cognitions about gambling.  That study fo-
cused on how risk taking affected cognitions, 
however, not how cognitions affected gam-
bling behavior. 
 These demonstrations are informative, 
but they are not abundant in the literature.  
Furthermore, as pointed out by Petry (2005), 
although it is possible to demonstrate that pa-
thological gamblers hold irrational beliefs 
about the game of chance they might be play-
ing, it is also the case that non-pathological 
gamblers hold similar beliefs.  Thus, these 
irrational rules may be necessary for the dis-
order, but they do not appear to be sufficient 
for it. 
 More germane to the current investiga-
tion is whether or not providing accurate in-
formation or rules will benefit the gambler.  
That is, both Dixon (2000) and Dixon et al. 
(2000) demonstrated that the introduction of 
inaccurate rules altered the gambling behavior 
of the participants.  Neither study showed that 
participants’ behavior could be altered by ac-
curate rules.  This point is an important one 
because it represents the foundation of the 
cognitive approach for the treatment of patho-
logical gambling (e.g., Ladouceur et al., 
2002).  Namely, if one can get the pathologi-
cal gambler to follow accurate rules, not inac-
curate ones, then the factor leading to the pa-
thology should be eliminated (but see Petry, 
2005). 
 For the present study, we recruited non-
pathological individuals to play a slot ma-
chine in four different sessions.  In the first 
two sessions, the participants were allowed to 
play (or not play) a slot machine.  Prior to the 
third session, participants were provided with 
accurate information about slot machines.  
One group was informed about the indepen-
dence of outcomes from play to play.  Anoth-
er group was informed of the diminishing re-
turns one can expect when one continues to 
play the slot machine.  The final group re-
ceived information on both the independence 
of outcomes and diminishing returns.  The 
participants then played (or did not play) in 
two additional gambling sessions. 
If gambling behavior is largely rule go-
verned, then one would predict that the intro-
duction of this information would lead to a 
decrease in participants’ gambling behavior.  
If participants’ beliefs in dependence of turns 
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or positive outcomes over time differ in how 
much they control behavior, then one would 
predict that information countering these be-
liefs would have a differential effect between 
groups.  Finally, if both beliefs are governing 
behavior, then one would predict the greatest 
decrease in gambling behavior for the group 
that receives information countering both be-
liefs. 
 
METHOD 
Participants 
 The participants were 18 (8 females, 10 
males) individuals who were recruited from 
the psychology department’s participant pool 
at the University of North Dakota.  To partic-
ipate, individuals had to be 21 years of age or 
older and score less than 5 on the South Oaks 
Gambling Screen (SOGS; Lesieur & Blume, 
1987).  The mean age of the participants was 
22.61 (SD=2.20) years.  All but one partici-
pant was single (or divorced).  All partici-
pants were Caucasian and all but two reported 
making $10,000 or less per year in annual in-
come.  No participant reported an annual in-
come above $25,000. 
 
Materials and Apparatus 
Participants completed a series of forms 
that included an informed consent form, a 
demographic questionnaire, the SOGS (Le-
sieur & Blume, 1987), and the Gambling 
Functional Assessment (GFA; Dixon & John-
son, 2007).  They completed these forms prior 
to participating in any gambling sessions. 
 The demographic questionnaire asked for 
five pieces of information: sex, age, marital 
status, race/ethnicity, and annual income.  
Each of these pieces of information was ob-
tained because each is a known risk factor for 
pathological gambling (see Petry, 2005). 
 The SOGS is a self-report questionnaire 
that contains 20 items.  The questionnaire 
asks respondents about their gambling history 
and is a widely used measure for screening 
for the possible presence of pathological 
gambling (Petry, 2005).  A score of 5 or 
above on the SOGS suggests that the respon-
dent may be a pathological gambler.  For the 
present study, potential participants who 
scored 5 or more on the SOGS were not al-
lowed to participate in the gambling sessions 
to assure that individuals who might be suf-
fering from pathology were not allowed to 
engage in their pathology.  No participants 
had to be excluded because of their score on 
the SOGS. 
 The GFA (Dixon & Johnson, 2007) is a 
self-report questionnaire that contains 20 
items.  The questionnaire asks respondents 
about the environments in which they gamble 
so as to potentially identify the consequences 
that might be maintaining their gambling be-
havior.  The GFA supposedly identifies four 
possible reinforcing consequences: sensory 
experiences, escape, attention, and tangible 
rewards (i.e., money).  Five questions are 
asked pertaining to each consequence, which 
respondents can score between 0 and 6, mak-
ing the top score for any category on the GFA 
30.  The category with the highest score is 
theorized to be the primary consequence 
maintaining the individual’s gambling. 
 Gambling sessions took place in a win-
dowless room that contained three slot ma-
chines.  All participants played the same one 
machine in each session.  It was an IGT “Red, 
White, and Blue” (wild) machine.  The ma-
chine allowed the participant to bet up to 
three coins per spin. The machines were pro-
grammed to accept tokens, which participants 
were informed were worth $0.05 each.  Out-
comes on the machine were programmed by a 
computer chip designed to provide an 87% 
return rate over an indefinite period of time.  
The machine was equipped with a series of 
counters (unobservable to the participant) that 
recorded the number of coins put into the ma-
chine and the number of coins dispensed.  All 
“wins” were paid in tokens (vs. being accu-
mulated on the machine as credits) to ensure 
an accurate count of the number of coins won.  
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The number of plays (i.e., spins) was not rec-
orded by the slot machine; therefore the re-
searcher monitored this measure manually. 
 
Procedure 
 All aspects of the procedure were ap-
proved by the Institutional Review Board at 
the University of North Dakota.  Participants 
were run individually.  When a participant 
arrived for the first session of the experiment, 
the researcher checked his/her identification 
to ensure the participant was 21 years of age 
or older.  The participant then went through 
the process of providing informed consent.  
Next, the participant completed the SOGS, 
followed by the demographic questionnaire 
and the GFA.  The researcher scored the 
SOGS while the participant was completing 
the final two questionnaires to ensure that the 
participant did not score 5 or more on the 
SOGS.  No participant did.  The researcher 
then seated the participant in front of the slot 
machine and read him/her the following in-
structions: 
 
You will now be given the opportunity to 
play on a slot machine.  You will be given 
100 tokens worth 5 cents each.  Thus, you 
are being given $5 to play with.  You may 
bet as many credits per play as the machine 
allows.  Your goal should be to end the ses-
sion with as many tokens as you can.  You 
may end the session at any time by inform-
ing the researcher that you would like to end 
the session.  The session will end when a) 
you quit playing, b) you run out of tokens, 
or c) 15 minutes have elapsed.  At the end of 
the experiment you will be paid in cash for 
the number of tokens you have left or have 
accumulated.  Do you have any questions? 
 
Questions were answered by repeating the 
above instructions.  The researcher then gave 
the participant a plastic cup that contained 
100 tokens and the participant played the slot 
machine until one of the three criteria for end-
ing the session was met.  When participants 
arrived for the second gambling session, the 
researcher informed them that the session was 
the same as the first.  The participant was 
again given 100 tokens and the session pro-
ceeded as did the first session. 
 Prior to the third gambling session, the 
participant was pseudo-randomly assigned to 
one of the three groups (n = 6).  The groups 
differed as to the information they received 
prior to the third session.  The pseudo-random 
nature of the procedure was that we attempted 
to keep the distribution of females and males 
similar across groups (i.e., 2, 3, & 3 females 
in groups 1, 2, & 3, respectively). 
 Participants in group one (Independence 
of Turns) were read the following instructions 
prior to beginning their third session: 
 
Slot machines are programmed to pay out on 
what are known as random-ratio schedules, 
meaning that each play is independent of 
another.  In other words, the outcome of 
your next play has absolutely no connection 
to the outcome of the previous or following 
play.  Furthermore, the machine does not 
“keep track” of how you are playing.  Each 
time you play, the outcome is randomly de-
termined according to a set probability.  
There is nothing you can do to increase the 
chances that a winning combination of sym-
bols will fall on the “win” line. 
 
 Participants in group two (Diminishing 
Returns) were read the following instructions 
prior to their third session: 
 
Slot machines are programmed to pay back 
players a certain percentage of the money 
that they play.  For instance, say a machine 
is programmed to pay back at 98%.  That 
means that, over a long period of time, that 
machine will return $98 for every $100 that 
is put into it.  Because the payback percen-
tage is always less than 100%, it is never to 
the player’s advantage to play for a long pe-
riod of time.  Furthermore, few slot ma-
chines provide a payback percentage as high 
as 98%.  Some may program payback per-
centages as low as 83% or lower.  Because 
one cannot tell the payback percentage by 
simply looking at the machine, it may take 
some time to determine that you are playing 
a machine with a low payback percentage.  
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By that point, you have likely lost a lot of 
money. 
 
 Participants in group three (Both) were 
read the information provided to both groups 
one and two.  Participants in all three groups 
were then given 100 tokens and the third ses-
sion proceeded similarly to the first two.  
When participants returned for their fourth 
session, they were again given 100 tokens 
(but were not read additional instructions).  At 
the completion of the fourth gambling ses-
sion, the researcher summed the total number 
of credits the participant had accumulated 
across the four sessions, paid the participant 
the equivalent in cash, debriefed the partici-
pant as to the nature of the study, and dis-
missed the participant. 
 
Design and Analysis 
 Two main dependent measures were tak-
en from the gambling sessions.  The first was 
the number of trials (i.e., plays of the slot ma-
chine) participants played per session.  This 
dependent variable served as a measure of 
persistence or duration of play.  The second 
measure was the total number of credits bet 
per session.  This dependent variable served 
as a measure of risk taking.  These two meas-
ures are positively, but not perfectly, corre-
lated.  That is, because it was possible for par-
ticipants to bet one, two, or three credits per 
trial, it was possible for a participant who 
played half the number of trials played by 
another participant to bet more credits than 
that other participant. 
 The data from individual subjects on 
these measures were subjected to a three-way 
(Group by Condition by Session) mixed mod-
el analysis of variance (ANOVA).  In these 
analyses, group (Independence of Turns, Di-
minishing Returns, Both) served as a be-
tween-subjects variable.  Condition (Baseline 
vs. Post Treatment) and session (First vs. 
Second) were repeated measures.  Results for 
these and all following analyses were consi-
dered significant a p<.05. 
 Secondary analyses were conducted by 
correlating participants’ scores on the SOGS 
and GFA with their behavior in the gambling 
session.  Because these scores could not be 
assigned causal roles and because there was 
no theoretical reason to believe that they 
would be correlated with behavior in specific 
gambling sessions (e.g., session 2), the corre-
lations were calculated using the average 
number of trials played and credits bet per 
session across all four gambling sessions.  
Gender was also correlated with these meas-
ures because the literature suggests that fe-
males and males differ in terms of their gam-
bling behavior (e.g., prevalence of pathologi-
cal gambling, types of games of chance they 
prefer; see Petry, 2005).  Furthermore, re-
search from our laboratory suggests that 
gender differences sometimes (Dannewitz & 
Weatherly, 2007; Weatherly, Austin, & Far-
well, 2007), but not always (e.g., Weatherly, 
McDougall, & Gillis, 2006), exist.  Correla-
tions were determined by calculating Pearson 
product-moment coefficients. 
 
RESULTS 
 The ANOVA conducted on the number 
of trials played yielded a non-significant main 
effect of group, F(2, 15) = 0.92, p=.421, Eta 
Squared = .109, suggesting that the three 
groups did not differ in the number of trials 
they played.  The main effect of condition 
was significant, F(1, 15) = 4.87, p=.043, Eta 
Squared = .245, indicating that providing in-
formation about slot machines altered the 
number of trials played.  The top graph of 
Figure 1 displays this effect, demonstrating 
that the information decreased the number of 
trials participants played.  The main effect of 
session was not significant, F(1, 15) = 0.52, 
p=.484, Eta Squared = .033, indicating that 
the number of trials played did not change 
significantly between sessions one and two.  
The interactions between group and condi-
tion, F(2, 15) = 0.08, p=.925, Eta Squared = 
.010, between group and session, F(2, 15) = 
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Figure 1.   Presented are the number of trials played (top graph) and credits bet (bottom 
graph) for the mean for all participants in each group in the two sessions before (BASE) and af-
ter (TRT) information about slot machines were provided.  The error bars represent one standard 
error of the mean across participants in that particular group in those particular sessions. 
 
.20, p=.820, Eta Squared = .026, between 
condition and session, F(1, 15) = 2.60, 
p=.128, Eta Squared = .148, and across group, 
condition, and session, F(2, 15) = 1.14, 
p=.347, Eta Squared = .132, all failed to reach 
significance, indicating that these measures 
did not vary systematically as a function of 
the other(s). 
 The ANOVA conducted on the number 
of credits bet also yielded a non-significant 
main effect of group, F(2, 15) = 0.78, p=.478, 
Eta Squared = .094, suggesting that the three 
groups did not differ in the number of credits 
they risked.  The main effect of condition was 
significant, F(1, 15) = 6.50, p=.022, Eta 
Squared = .302, indicating that providing in-
formation about slot machines systematically 
altered the number of credits participants bet.  
The bottom graph of Figure 1 displays this 
effect, again demonstrating that providing the 
information decreased participants’ gambling.  
The main effect of session was not significant 
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Table 1 
Presented are the Pearson product-moment coefficients between SOGS score, gender, GFA 
scores, and the mean of the two dependent measures from across the four gambling sessions. 
 
SOGS Gender GFA 
Sensory 
GFA 
Escape 
GFA 
Attention. 
GFA 
Tang. 
Trials 
Played 
Credits Bet 
SOGS 1.00 -.090 .420 .332 .270 .540* .355 .023 
Gender  1.00 -.356 -.340 -.451 -.368 -.396 -.575* 
GFA 
Sensory 
  1.00 .788** .781** .617** .678** .654** 
GFA 
Escape 
   1.00 .412 .344 .482* .466 
GFA 
Attent. 
    1.00 .768** .524* .595** 
GFA 
Tang. 
     1.00 .610** .510* 
Trials 
Played 
      1.00 .850** 
Credits 
Bet 
       1.00 
* p<.05 
** p<.01 
 
F(1, 15) = 0.46, p=.507, Eta Squared = .030, 
indicating that the number of credits bet did 
not change significantly between sessions one 
and two.  The interactions between group and 
condition, F(2, 15) = 0.03, p=.973, Eta 
Squared = .004, between group and session, 
F(2, 15) = .92, p=.420, Eta Squared = .109, 
between condition and session, F(1, 15) = 
3.49, p=.082, Eta Squared = .189, and across 
group, condition, and session, F(2, 15) = 0.88, 
p=.436, Eta Squared = .105, all failed to reach 
significance, indicating that these measures 
did not vary systematically as a function of 
the other(s). 
 Table 1 presents the correlations between 
the SOGS scores, participants’ gender, GFA 
scores, and the behavioral measures from the 
gambling sessions.  Participants’ SOGS 
scores were significantly correlated their 
score on the “tangible” questions of the GFA, 
but not with actual gambling behavior.  Fe-
males tended to bet fewer credits than males, 
but the correlation between gender and trials 
played was not significant.  Scores on the 
GFA were nearly all significantly correlated 
with participants’ gambling behavior, and al-
so with other scores on the GFA.  As sug-
gested above, the number of trials played and 
the total number of credits bet per session 
were significantly correlated. 
 
DISCUSSION 
 The present experiment was designed to 
determine whether providing players with ac-
curate information about slot machines would 
lead to a decrease in their gambling on them.  
Participants in the present study were pro-
vided information about the independence of 
outcomes, the negative rate of return, or both 
after playing a slot machine for two sessions.  
The introduction of this information led to a 
significant decrease in gambling behavior in 
the subsequent two sessions.  These results 
therefore support the idea that gambling be-
havior is at least partially rule governed. 
 Ladouceur et al. (2002) suggested that 
two of the primary fallacious thought patterns 
that lead to pathological gambling are the per-
son’s inability to recognize that one outcome 
of a game of chance (i.e., spin of the reels on 
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a slot machine) is independent of the other 
outcomes and the person’s thinking that, 
sooner or later, the person must win.  Partici-
pants in the current study were either pro-
vided with information meant to confront one 
of these beliefs or both.  The analyses did not 
find a main effect of group, indicating that 
information on one type of fallacy did not in-
fluence gambling behavior differently than 
information on the other type.  The results 
also suggest that there was no cumulative ef-
fect of providing information on both types of 
fallacies.  Thus, although the present results 
support the idea that gambling can be de-
creased by providing accurate information 
about these beliefs, it does not provide evi-
dence that one type of information is better 
than the other or that more information is bet-
ter than less.  In fact, it is quite possible that 
the introduction of the accurate information 
served to establish a general rule such as 
“don’t trust slot machines” rather than alter-
ing the targeted beliefs (i.e., independence of 
turns, diminishing returns). 
 It is also worthy of note that although the 
introduction of accurate information regard-
ing slot machines significantly decreased 
gambling behavior, it did not eliminate it.  In 
fact, in the 72 gambling sessions that were 
conducted, in only one did a participant 
choose not to gamble and thus keep the $5 she 
had been staked.  Interestingly, this outcome 
occurred in the second session of the experi-
ment, prior to the introduction of information 
about slot machines.  Thus, the present results 
suggest that information alone is not enough 
to get non-pathological gamblers to choose 
not to gamble.  It would seem reasonable to 
assume that pathological gamblers would be 
more motivated to gamble than non-
pathological gamblers, which would lead one 
to predict that information alone may have 
less of an impact on the behavior of patholog-
ical gamblers than observed in the present 
study. 
 One could potentially argue that the ob-
served decreases in gambling were not due to 
the presentation of accurate information, but 
rather represent a systematic decrease in 
gambling over consecutive sessions (e.g., ha-
bituation to the procedure).  However, results 
from the statistical analyses can rule out this 
possibility.  The above analyses failed to pro-
duce a main effect of session.  This result in-
dicates that gambling did not systematically 
vary from the first to the second session.  Fur-
thermore, none of the possible interactions 
involving session were significant, indicating 
that changes from the first to second session 
were not altered as a function of other va-
riables.  Neither result should have been ob-
served if gambling behavior was changing as 
a function of time. 
 Another argument could be made that the 
present results are of limited value because 
the participants were gambling with money 
that they had been staked, rather than with 
their own money.  This argument cannot be 
completely countered and will always be one 
that can be made against gambling research 
conducted in a laboratory setting.  However, 
existing research has demonstrated that when 
people are gifted an item, such as the money 
staked to them in the current experiment, they 
treat it as if they owned it (e.g., Kahneman, 
Knetsch, & Thaler, 1990).  Furthermore, re-
search from our laboratory has demonstrated 
that participants gambling with actual (staked) 
money gamble more conservatively than 
when they are playing with credits that have 
no monetary value (Weatherly & Brandt, 
2004; Weatherly & Meier, 2007).  These re-
sults support the idea that the money staked to 
participants does have value. 
 If the present procedure was to be repli-
cated, several variations might be warranted.  
For instance, the participants were presented 
with the accurate information only once.  Al-
though its effect was still present in the 
second, post-information session, repeating 
that information may have had a cumulative 
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effect.  Next, it is also possible that, had more 
than two post-instruction sessions been con-
ducted differences in the impact of the differ-
ent types of information may have emerged.  
Furthermore, it is possible that the effect of 
accurate information is, in fact, short lived.  
Additional sessions would be required to de-
termine whether or not this possibility is a 
valid one.  Finally, in the present procedure, 
the researcher was present during the sessions 
to record the number of trials played.  Be-
cause this situation occurred in every session, 
it is not possible to tell the impact of having 
the researcher present. 
 In terms of the correlation data in the 
present study, there were several interesting 
associations between self reports and actual 
behavior.  The SOGS, which is a widely used 
but sometimes criticized measure (see Petry, 
2005), did not correlate with participants’ 
gambling behavior.  It did, however, correlate 
with another self-report measure, namely the 
“tangible” consequences category of the 
GFA.  This result is of interest because Wea-
therly and Dixon (2007) postulated that pa-
thological gambling occurs when money be-
comes the main reinforcing consequence driv-
ing the person’s gambling.  The present result 
is consistent with that view. 
 The fact that scores on the GFA were 
nearly all significantly correlated with the 
participants’ actual gambling behavior sug-
gests that the GFA has value, perhaps for both 
research and treatment purposes.  However, it 
is also the case that some of the different con-
sequences the GFA was designed to measure 
were significantly correlated with the other 
consequences.  This result would suggest that 
the different categories of the GFA may not in 
fact be measuring separate factors, a finding 
that is consistent with recent research on the 
GFA (Miller, Meier, Muehlenkamp, & Wea-
therly, in press).  Thus, although the screen 
appears to have value, it would seem that it 
needs to be honed so that the separate catego-
ries are in fact measuring separate contingen-
cies. 
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INVESTIGATING ILLUSION OF CONTROL IN EXPERIENCED AND 
NON-EXPERIENCED GAMBLERS: REPLICATION AND EXTENSION 
 
Lingyuan Wong 
California State University, Fresno 
 
Jennifer L. Austin 
University of Houston, Clear Lake
 
The illusion of control is a phenomenon in which one erroneously believes he or 
she can exert control over the contingencies of chance events. To date, many of 
the studies investigating this phenomenon as it applies to gambling have used 
artificial gambling contexts and participants with no history of gambling beha-
vior (i.e., undergraduates).  This study replicated the procedures outlined in Di-
xon, Hayes and Ebbs (1998) using experienced and inexperienced gamblers in a 
more natural gambling setting.  Participants played 20 rounds of a game of rou-
lette in which the default procedure was for the dealer to choose the bets.  How-
ever, players could choose their own bets by paying extra chips.  Results indi-
cated that most participants did not buy control of chip placement, indicating an 
absence of illusion of control.  However, the two participants with the highest 
scores on the South Oaks Gambling Screen engaged in behaviors consistent with 
illusion of control across almost every trial. 
Keywords: illusion of control, experienced gamblers, non-experienced 
gamblers  
____________________
 
 
Illusion of control has been defined as an 
“expectancy of a personal success probability 
inappropriately higher than the objective 
probability would warrant” (Langer, 1975, p. 
313).  When present in gamblers, such faulty 
beliefs can prompt individuals to wager more 
money across gambling opportunities (Dixon, 
Hayes, Rehfeldt, & Ebbs, 1998; Joukhador, 
Blaszczynski, & Maccallum, 2004) and to 
engage in riskier betting (Dixon, Hayes, & 
Ebbs, 1998).  Further, such beliefs appear to 
be the most commonly self-reported heuristic 
__________ 
Address Correspondence to: 
Jennifer L. Austin, Ph.D., BCBA 
Division of Psychology 
Forest Hall 
University of Glamorgan 
Pontypridd 
CF37 1DL 
United Kingdom 
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for people who gamble regularly or heavily 
(Toneatto, Blitz-Miller, Calderwood, Drago-
netti, & Tsanos, 1997) and tend to be more 
prevalent in those with gambling problems 
(Joukhador et al., 2004; Moore & Ohtsuka, 
1999). 
Several factors appear to influence 
whether behaviors consistent with illusions of 
control actually reveal themselves.  Langer’s 
(1975) classic study displayed a range of sti-
mulus situations that might influence en-
gagement in behaviors consistent with a belief 
that chance events can be personally con-
trolled.  Specifically, her analyses suggested 
__________ 
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that illusion of control is more prevalent in 
situations where one’s competitor looks less 
confident, when the game allows the player a 
choice, and when the player is familiar with 
or has practiced the game.  Her study also re-
vealed that simply thinking about a game 
across time can increase the tendency to be-
lieve in one’s ability to control chance out-
comes.  It does appear, however, that beha-
viors associated with illusions of control can 
be altered.  For example, Dixon (2000) dem-
onstrated the malleability of illusion of con-
trol behaviors via the provision of accurate 
(e.g., “it does not make a difference who 
picks the number”) and inaccurate (e.g., 
“you’ll win more if you choose your own 
numbers”) rules.  Participants in the study 
played a series of rounds of roulette and could 
bet as many chips as they chose on 8:1 bets.  
However, on some trials the participants were 
allowed to choose the number, whereas as the 
number for the remaining trials was selected 
by the researcher.  Each participant was ex-
posed to three conditions: no rules, inaccurate 
rules, and accurate rules.  Results showed that 
the majority of participants wagered more 
chips in the no rules and inaccurate rules 
phases than they wagered when accurate rules 
were provided.  These results suggest that ex-
ternal sources of information potentially can 
exert a strong effect on illusions of control 
and the behaviors associated with such be-
liefs.  In fact, Ferland, Ladouceur, and Vitaro 
(2002) found that adolescents’ misconcep-
tions about gambling decreased after viewing 
an informational video explaining the chance 
nature of gambling and the uselessness of 
one’s behaviors in controlling gambling out-
comes.  Lectures and activities designed to 
further explain the video’s points produced 
even stronger effects on participants’ reports 
of beliefs in illusory control.   
One potential hypothesis to explain illu-
sion of control is that people who foster such 
beliefs are insensitive to probabilities and thus 
cannot discern when outcomes are related to 
chance.  Koehler, Gibbs, and Hogarth (1994) 
tested this hypothesis by measuring betting 
behavior on dice games that involved one 
chance to bet (“single shot”) or multiple op-
portunities (“multi-shot) on a simple dice 
game with 2:1 odds.  Results showed that 
when the game consisted of one trial, partici-
pants who were allowed to throw the dice 
themselves bet more than those whose throws 
were made by the researcher.  However, when 
participants were required to bet over a series 
of trials, they began to make their bets based 
on the obvious 50% probability of winning on 
any given trial.  Moreover probability-
sensitive behavior occurred regardless of 
whether participants threw the dice them-
selves or the throw was controlled by the re-
searcher.  These results suggest that although 
illusion of control might be present initially, 
repeated trials “shatter” the illusion.   
In a related study, Dixon, Hayes, and 
Ebbs (1998) sought to discern illusory control 
on risk-taking behaviors across multiple trials 
of roulette.  During the course of each game, 
the amount of each player’s bet was kept con-
stant and was provisionally restricted to cor-
ner bets.  However, participants could pay an 
additional chip for the opportunity to choose 
the number on a corner bet, and an additional 
chip to place their chips on a lower risk bet.  
Unlike Koehler et al. (1994), Dixon et al.’s 
participants repeatedly paid additional chips 
to gain control of chip placement and lower 
their risks, suggesting that repeated exposure 
to chance events does not alter illusions of 
control.  However, it is possible that these dif-
ferences can be accounted for by differences 
in the games played.  Specifically, Koehler et 
al. used a relatively simple game where the 
odds remained at 2:1.  Roulette could be con-
sidered a more complicated game in which 
odds vary depending on chip placement, thus 
making probabilities more difficult to discern.  
In any event, the conflicting results of the two 
studies raise interesting questions about the 
effects of repeated exposure to probabilistic 
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outcomes on illusion of control, as well as the 
influence of familiarity with the game and 
consistency of the odds. 
Clearly, the extant literature examining 
illusion of control demonstrates the complexi-
ty of this phenomenon and the need for addi-
tional research.  Such investigations have and 
likely will continue to shed light on important 
variables in the treatment of pathological 
gambling (Petry, 2005).  However, a potential 
problem in much of the research examining 
the role of illusion of control on gambling be-
havior is that is relies very heavily on self re-
port measures (e.g., Joukhador et al., 2004; 
Moore & Ohtsuka, 1999; Strickland, Taylor, 
Hendon, Provost, & Bizo, 2006; Toneatto et 
al., 1997) as opposed to direct measures of 
behavior.  There is probably good reason for 
this.  First, one’s ethics might be challenged if 
people with serious gambling problems were 
allowed to engage in potentially dangerous 
behavior for the sake of participating in a 
study. Additionally, because casinos in the 
United States are required to pay-out at a pre-
specified regulations and rates, experiments 
which require altering the pay-out and rules 
are not permitted on the premises (Weatherly 
& Phelps, 2006). Though some venues may 
allow direct observation of consenting partic-
ipants, this still limits investigations of factors 
which may directly affect gambling behavior.  
Given the constraints of examining such be-
haviors in the environments in which they are 
likely to occur, researchers have used com-
puter simulations (Haw, 2008; MacLin, Di-
xon, & Hayes, 1999), which allow flexibility 
with manipulating the parameters and more 
precision in gathering behavioral data, such as 
response latency, decision-making periods, 
and subjective probability estimates.   
Despite a strong reliance on self report 
measures within the gambling literature, some 
studies have endeavored to directly assess be-
haviors consistent with illusion of control 
(Dixon et al., 1998; Dixon et al., 1998a; Di-
xon 2000; Dixon et al., 2000; Koehler et al., 
1994; Langer, 1975).  However, the popula-
tions from which these measures are collected 
are comprised exclusively of convenience 
samples of college students.  It is clear that 
examination of behavior with this particular 
population is sometimes valuable.  For exam-
ple,  Dixon et al. (1998) stated “No subjects 
had previous experience playing roulette and 
therefore were chosen to control for any pre-
conceived strategies of how to best play the 
game” (p. 960).  This statement indicates that 
some studies may have used such samples 
deliberately to control for particular con-
founds.  There is no doubt that the use of 
these populations also might allow research-
ers to construct and run important pilot stu-
dies crucial for informing future research.  
Despite the potential advantages of using 
convenience samples for the study of gam-
bling behavior, it is unclear whether the find-
ings from these studies generalize to actual 
gamblers.  The leap of inferring the behaviors 
of gamblers from non-gamblers may lead to 
an inaccurate understanding of important be-
haviors.  Inasmuch as this research may pro-
vide a foundation for more effective treat-
ments for pathological gambling, accurate 
understanding of behavior is imperative.    
The purpose of this study was to examine 
the illusion of control and risk-taking beha-
viors using participants with and without his-
tories of gambling.  Additionally, we sought 
to systematically replicate the procedures of 
Dixon et al. (1998) to determine whether re-
sults attained with college students generalize 
to those who gamble regularly. We also ex-
amined gambling behaviors under more natu-
ralistic stimulus conditions in an attempt to 
improve the external generality of the proce-
dures and results. 
 
METHOD 
Participants and Setting 
Seventy nine potential participants were re-
cruited via advertisements published in the 
local newspaper, on the premises of a local 
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Table 1 
Participant Demographics 
Participant Age Sex 
Years of  
Experience 
Is participant a 
student? 
SOGS 
Score 
Roulette Quiz Score 
E1 27 Female 9 Yes 2 4 
E2 54 Female 33 No 0 5 
E3 31 Male 16 No 4 4 
E4 45 Male 27 No 3 4 
N1 22 Female 0 Yes 0 0 
N2 22 Female 0 Yes 0 0 
N3 27 Male 0 Yes 0 0 
 
university, and through word-of-mouth. Each 
of the 79 respondents subsequently were 
mailed a package containing an informed 
consent form, a questionnaire about gambling 
experience, a five-question assessment on the 
rules of roulette, the South Oaks Gambling 
Screen (SOGS, Lesieur & Blume, 1987), in-
formation about the local Gamblers Anonym-
ous chapter, and a stamped return envelope. 
Twenty nine potential participants returned 
the required forms and were considered for 
inclusion in the study.  
SOGS scores subsequently were re-
viewed by the first author to further narrow 
the participant pool.  Out of the pool of 29 
potential participants, 7 scored >5 on the 
SOGS, indicating a potential risk for patho-
logical gambling.  Because inclusion of pa-
thological gamblers would raise ethical con-
cerns (i.e., participation in the study would 
allow engagement in dangerous behavior) and 
was not approved by the university’s Institu-
tional Review Board (IRB), only respondents 
with scores <4 were eligible to participate in 
this study.  Of those who scored <4 on the 
SOGS, a score of at least 4 on a 5-item ques-
tionnaire regarding rules of roulette play was 
required for inclusion as an experienced par-
ticipant.  Five respondents met this criterion.  
Further, a score of 1 or 0 on the questionnaire 
was required to be classified as a non-
experienced participant.  Five respondents 
met this criterion.  A follow-up phone call 
was made to those individuals to provide ad-
ditional details about participation and to con-
firm interest.  Given the monetary costs asso-
ciated with conducting the study (i.e., staking 
participants with real money), only 8 of the 10 
potential participants were invited to partici-
pate in the study.  These participants were se-
lected via a random draw.  
Seven of the 8 participants reported to the 
experiment as requested.  The 4 experienced 
gamblers included 2 men (ages 31 and 45) 
and 2 women (ages 27 and 54). Three of the 
experienced gamblers held various job voca-
tions in the community while the fourth was 
an undergraduate student. All had played the 
table-top version of American roulette on at 
least three occasions.  The 3 inexperienced 
participants included a man (age 27) and 2 
women (both age 22), all of whom were col-
lege post-baccalaureate students.  None of 
these participants had prior experience play-
ing any form of casino-related games. A de-
tailed table of the participants’ demographics 
is provided in Table 1. 
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The games were held in a classroom at 
California State University, Fresno. The rou-
lette table was rented from a local company 
which specialized in hosting casino-themed 
parties, and a dealer was hired to run the 
games for experimental sessions. On the day 
of the study, participants’ IDs were verified 
for their name and age before they were al-
lowed to participate in the study.  
They also were assured that all personal 
information would be kept confidential as 
specified in their informed consent. All pro-
cedures were approved by the university’s 
Institutional Review Board prior to participant 
selection. 
 
Procedure 
Participants played the game with all oth-
er participants of similar experience (i.e., all 4 
experienced gamblers played during a single 
session and all 3 inexperienced gamblers 
played during a single session).  Prior to be-
ginning play, participants were staked with 80 
chips with a value of $20 (i.e., each chip was 
worth $.25). The following instructions, mod-
eled after the procedures of Dixon et al. 
(1998a), were then given verbally by the 
dealer:   
 
“This is a fair roulette wheel. It is identical 
in all ways to the roulette wheel found in the 
casinos in America. You will be given 80 
chips which are equivalent to $20. Each chip 
is worth 25 cents. You will be playing for 20 
rounds, and there is no limit to the amount 
you can win. Each round will start with a de-
fault wager of five chips on 8:1 odds, where 
I will choose the number to bet on. If you 
wish to choose your own numbers to bet on, 
it will cost one extra chip. Though you gain 
control of placing all your five chips, you 
still need to stake it on a corner bet.  If you 
wish to make a lower risk bet, that being 2:1 
or 1:1 bet only, each additional lower-risk 
bet will also cost an additional chip, and it 
will permit all your bets to be placed in 
areas of lower risks. Hence, if you want to 
control and reduce the risks, it will cost you 
two chips. Keep in mind that these addition-
al chips are not applied to your bet. Rather, 
it will always remain a 5-chip bet; only the 
numbers chosen or the odds will be differ-
ent. In addition, the wagered chips cannot be 
split in to different bet ratios or choose to 
gain partial control of the chips. In the event 
of someone ending the game before the 20 
rounds are completed, he/she will still have 
to wait for the other players to complete 
their game.  Remember, each chip is worth 
25 cents, and at the end of the game, your 
remaining chips can be cashed in for money, 
only if you had wagered on all the 20 
rounds. There is no borrowing or lending of 
chips in this experiment. Do any of you have 
any questions before we start the game? You 
can still ask questions about the game when 
it is in play.”  
 
Subsequently, participants’ questions 
were answered. The participants then played 
20 games of roulette.  To ensure that players 
knew the option to purchase control or lower 
risks was available each game, the dealer 
asked each player individually how they 
would like to place their bets on each round.  
At the end of the 20 rounds, each player was 
paid in cash according to the number of chips 
he or she had remaining. 
 
Procedural Fidelity  
An experienced roulette dealer was employed 
to ensure the proper procedure of the game 
was conducted. He was trained to read the 
above instructions and to carry out the proce-
dures as specified in the instructions (e.g., 
taking a chip from a participant when the par-
ticipant decided to purchase control). Subse-
quently, he was assessed for his adherence by 
role-playing with the primary experimenter 
and several research assistants. During these 
sessions, a trained observer recorded adhe-
rence to each step of the procedure on a 
checklist.  The dealer performed all the cor-
rect steps on 10 consecutive practice rounds 
before the start of the study. Subsequently, 
treatment integrity was assessed for each ex-
perimental session.  Adherence to the protocol 
was 100% for every round conducted during 
the study. 
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Figure 1.  Cumulative winnings in comparison to the cumulative number of trials in which 
control and decrement of risk were purchased by participants. 
 
 
Dependent Variables and Measurement 
Three primary dependent variables were 
measured.  A purchase of a decrement in risk 
was defined as any trial which a participant 
paid an extra chip (beyond the five chips al-
lowed for each trial) to have his/her chips 
placed somewhere other than a corner bet.  A 
purchase of control was defined as any round 
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in which a participant paid an extra chip to 
gain control of the numbers selected for the 
bet.  A win was defined as any situation in 
which the participant was given a payout due 
to a match between placement of chips and 
the number selected on the roulette wheel 
spin.  A win was scored (and the number of 
chips was recorded) even when a participant’s 
total winnings did not exceed the amount wa-
gered for that trial. 
A frequency count of the purchase of a 
decrement in risk and/or control and the out-
come of each trial was recorded using a pa-
per-and-pencil data sheet, which also allowed 
for recording the amount won on each trial.  
Two video cameras were used to record all 
sessions. One camera was placed on each side 
of the roulette table to capture footage from 
both perspectives. 
 
Interobserver Agreement (IOA) 
IOA was assessed for 100% of the expe-
rimental sessions and was calculated for each 
dependent variable by dividing the smaller 
observed frequency by the larger observed 
frequency and multiplying by 100% (Bailey 
& Bostow, 1979; Repp, Deitz, Boles, Deitz, 
& Repp, 1976). IOA for purchase of decre-
ment of risk averaged 97.5% (range, 95% - 
100%).  IOA for purchase of control was 
100%.  IOA for wins averaged 97.5% (range, 
95% - 100%).  
 
Self Reports of Winnings and Social Validity  
At the end of the study, participants were 
asked to estimate the total number of trials in 
which they won and the total number of chips 
they won across all trials.  In addition, a ques-
tionnaire was given to each participant at the 
conclusion of game play to provide an indica-
tion of how the setting for the study compared 
to roulette play at a casino and whether the 
participants felt their responses during the ex-
perimental sessions were similar to those they 
would have made if they were gambling in a 
casino. 
RESULTS 
Table 2 displays a summary of the num-
ber of trials in which control and decrement 
of risk were purchased and the number of 
chips won for each participant, along with 
information regarding gambling experience.  
Figure 1 displays the cumulative winnings in 
comparison to the cumulative number of trials 
in which control and decrement of risk was 
purchased by experienced participants. Partic-
ipants E1 and E2 (SOGS scores 2 and 0, re-
spectively) never purchased the opportunity to 
gain control of their chips.  However, E1 paid 
to increase her odds of winning by lowering 
her risk on one occasion, whereas E2 stayed 
with the corner bets throughout all 20 trials. 
The participants’ cumulative winnings were 
67 chips and 88 chips respectively.  Partici-
pants E3 and E4 (SOGS scores 4 and 3, re-
spectively) purchased both control and the 
opportunity to decrease their risk on almost 
every trial.  Their total winnings over 20 trials 
were 55 chips and 58 chips, respectively.  
Figure 2 displays the cumulative winnings in 
comparison to the cumulative number of trials 
in which control and decrement of risk was 
purchased by non-experienced participants.  
The non-experienced participants bought rela-
tively few opportunities to control the place-
ment of their chips or to improve their odds of 
winning. N1 and N2 never bought control 
during the experiment, while N3 did so on 
only four occasions. However, N1 improved 
her odds of winning twice, while N2 and N3 
maintained their wagers on the corner bets 
throughout. Their cumulative winnings were 
36, 88, and 64 chips, respectively.   
An independent samples t-test, after ad-
justing for a significant difference in the ho-
mogeneity of variance, revealed that the expe-
rienced participants did not purchase signifi-
cantly more control (m = .49, sd = .5) than the 
non-experienced participants (m = .07, sd = 
.25), t(3.33) = -1.454, p = .233, d = 1.06. Si-
milarly, an independent samples t-test, after 
adjusting for a significant difference in the
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Table 2 
Total Number of Chips Won, Control and Decrement of Risk Purchased by Each Participant 
Participant 
Total Chips 
Won 
Control 
Risk  
Decrement 
Years of  
Experience 
SOGS Score 
Roulette Quiz 
Score 
E1 67 0 1 9 2 4 
E2 88 0 0 33 0 5 
E3 55 20 20 16 4 4 
E4 58 19 19 27 3 4 
N1 36 0 2 0 0 0 
N2 88 0 0 0 0 0 
N3 64 5 0 0 0 0 
 
homogeneity of variance, revealed that the 
experienced participants also did not purchase 
significantly more decrement of risk (m = .5, 
sd = .5) than the non-experienced participants 
(m = .33, sd = .18), t(3.08) = -1.687, p = .188, 
d = .452.  However, Pearson r coefficients 
revealed that SOGS scores were correlated 
with purchase of control (r (6) = .843, p = .01) 
and purchase of risk decrements (r (6) = .887, 
p = .008). 
 
Self Report and Social Validity 
Participants from both groups reported 
that the dealer performed professionally or 
very professionally throughout the experi-
ment. All but one of experienced participants 
indicated that they would make most of the 
same decisions they made during the experi-
ment at an actual casino, whereas one re-
ported he/she would have made some of the 
some decisions in an actual casino.  
The estimated number of winning trials 
as indicated by the non-experienced partici-
pants ranged between 5 and 12, while the ex-
perienced participants ranged from 7 to 13. 
The actual number of winning trials for the 
non-experienced participants varied between 
6 and 10, and the experienced participants 
varied between 9 and 11 trials. Thus, both 
groups appeared relatively accurate in esti-
mating the number of trials in which they 
won.   
Experienced participants estimated win-
ning between 30 and 70 chips, while the inex-
perienced participants reported winning be-
tween 32 and 96 chips. The actual range of 
number of chips won by the experienced and 
the inexperienced participants were 55 to 88 
and 36 to 88, respectively. By comparison, 
the non-experienced gamblers better esti-
mated their winnings than the experienced 
participants. 
 
DISCUSSION 
This study examined illusions of control in 
experienced and inexperienced gamblers us-
ing a simulated casino roulette game.  Results 
indicated that the behaviors of the inexpe-
rienced participants were relatively uniform 
throughout the game, and that they rarely pur-
chased control and decrement of risk.  Interes-
tingly, two of the experienced participants 
also displayed the same pattern of behavior, 
whereas the other two experienced players 
bought control of chip placement and a 
decrement of risk on the majority of trials.  
One purpose of the current study was to as-
sess the generality of Dixon et al.’s (1998) 
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Figure 2.  Cumulative winnings in comparison to the cumulative number of trials in which 
control and decrement of risk were purchased by non-experienced participants. 
 
results to participants with a history of gam-
bling and to measure behavior within a more 
natural context.  To this end, we recruited par-
ticipants with various histories of gambling 
from both community and university popula-
tions, whereas Dixon et al. focused mainly on 
undergraduate students who might or might 
not have had experience gambling (although 
they did not have experience with roulette). 
We also attempted to more closely approx-
imate actual casino betting by using a regular 
roulette table and hiring a professional dealer.  
Interestingly, the outcomes of this study 
differed substantially from those obtained by 
Dixon et al (1998).  Specifically, all of the 
participants in the prior study bought control 
of their chips on at least 10 out of 20 trials. 
Further, 4 out of 5 participants chose to lower 
their risk on more than half of the trials.  In 
the current study, 5 out of the 7 participants 
rarely purchased control or decrement of risk.  
Therefore, the behavior of the majority of the 
current participants demonstrated responding 
inconsistent with illusions of control.   
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It is difficult to determine exactly which 
variables might have accounted for differenc-
es in responding between participants in the 
two studies or which study represented a more 
authentic sample of behavior.  However, it is 
imperative to note that the studies differed 
substantially with regard to stimulus condi-
tions.  Dixon et al. (1998) used a graduate re-
search assistant or professor in the role of the 
dealer, whereas we used a professional dealer.  
Moreover, payouts in Dixon et al.’s study 
were in the form of extra course credit, as op-
posed to the real money used in our study.  It 
is possible that in Dixon et al.’s study, these 
variables exerted stimulus control over beha-
vior that might not be analogous to typical 
gambling situations, and produced potential 
“false positives” of illusions of control.  In 
other words, the participants knew they were 
in an experiment with someone who had di-
rect influence over their grades; therefore, 
they might have thought that they needed to 
continue engaging in behavior (i.e., buying 
control and risk decrement) to be a “good par-
ticipant” in the study.  It also is unclear as to 
whether the students who participated in Di-
xon et al.’s study needed extra credit.  A bet-
ter understanding of the motivating operations 
(Laraway, Snycerski, & Poling, 2003) for the 
stimuli used as reinforcers would probably 
assist in understanding gambling behavior, 
both in Dixon et al.’s study and the current 
study. 
Another difference between the prior and 
current study was the manner in which partic-
ipants played the game.  Dixon et al.’s (1998) 
players were run individually, whereas the 
current study grouped participants according 
to their level of experience. It is possible that 
such groupings might have facilitated interac-
tion between the players. For instance, the 
players might have been influenced by each 
other’s playing strategies based on how much 
the other players won throughout the game. In 
fact, N3 mentioned that his purchase of con-
trol was somewhat mediated by N2’s win-
nings. On the few occasions when N3 pur-
chased control, he was deliberately trying to 
follow the placement of N2’s chips. Thus, the 
effects of grouping the participants might 
have altered some of their responses, whereas 
Dixon et al. probably provided a better indica-
tion of individual responding.  However, giv-
en that roulette is typically played in groups 
in most gambling environments, research 
aimed at understanding the effects of group 
processes on illusions of control might pro-
vide valuable insights into influences on 
gambling behavior. 
Although the failure to replicate Dixon et 
al.’s (1998) findings raises interesting ques-
tions, the current study poses some intriguing 
findings in its own right.  First, although our 
results were not consistent with Dixon et al.’s, 
they also were not consistent with of Koehler 
et al. (1994).  Specifically, most participants 
in the current study never engaged in beha-
viors consistent with illusions of control, even 
on the initial trials.  These results suggest that 
our participants were sensitive to the random 
nature of roulette from the beginning and be-
haved accordingly. 
The striking differences in responding 
within the experienced group of gamblers 
were unexpected.  Specifically, we anticipated 
that all the experienced gamblers would be 
more inclined to demonstrate illusions of con-
trol than inexperienced gamblers, given likely 
histories of reinforcement for engaging in 
these behaviors.  However, it appeared that 
current (as opposed to remote) reinforcement 
histories might have exerted substantial influ-
ence on behavior.  For example, E1 and E2 
quickly experienced wins when they let the 
dealer place their bets at the start of the game, 
and continued to let the dealer place bets 
throughout most of the game.  Similarly, E3 
and E4 experienced wins for buying control 
and reducing risks early in the game and con-
tinued to engage in these behaviors relatively 
consistently across the study, even when the 
strategy no longer paid off for them.  Given 
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the odds of a fair roulette wheel, any even 
bets would pay off 47.3% of the time (al-
though each trial is independent from the pre-
vious trial).  However, E3 and E4 began 
switching between the colors and later be-
tween bets.  Further, it appeared that access to 
a win on a previous trial did not necessarily 
predict behavior for a subsequent trial.  For 
example, E4 allowed the dealer to place his 
chips for him on trial 18 and won. Yet on trial 
19, E4 purchased both control and risk 
decrement. These behaviors suggest that both 
immediate and remote reinforcement contin-
gencies are relevant in predicting gambling 
behavior.  Specifically, it could be that E3’s 
and E4’s histories with gambling engendered 
beliefs about their abilities to control the out-
come of the game. 
It is interesting to note that the two par-
ticipants who displayed behaviors consistent 
with illusion of control (E3 and E4) also had 
higher scores on the SOGS relative to other 
players.  These findings are consistent with 
those of Toneatto et al. (1997), who found a 
significant relationship between SOGS scores 
and self-reported cognitive distortions.  How-
ever, this study represents a substantial im-
provement over prior studies that have com-
pared the beliefs of participants with different 
gambling histories (e.g., Joukhador et al., 
2004; Moore & Ohtsuka, 1999; Strickland et 
al., 2006; Toneatto et al., 1997), in that we 
directly observed behaviors indicating illu-
sions of control rather than simply asking par-
ticipants to report whether they engaged in 
such behaviors.  Although the small sample 
size limits generality of the findings, it raises 
interesting questions about differences in the 
actual behaviors and beliefs of different gam-
bling populations (e.g., non-gamblers, social 
gamblers, problem gamblers, etc.).  Future 
research should seek to incorporate more di-
rect behavioral measures to discern differen-
tial responding among populations.  These 
findings might prove crucial to understanding 
gambling behavior and assessing the external 
validity of studies using convenience samples. 
Another interesting finding was the posi-
tive correlation between SOGS scores and 
purchase of risk decrement.  Whereas paying 
to control chip placement on an 8:1 bet would 
not influence winnings, paying to place one’s 
bet on a 2:1 would.  Dixon et al. (1998) sug-
gested that both these behaviors are consistent 
with illusions of control, in that “while res-
ponses at these choice points may influence 
the size of a win or loss, the win or loss itself 
is randomly set” (p. 960).  However, one 
might also argue that paying to wager on less 
risky bets represents a greater sensitivity to 
the actual odds of winning and losing.  Like 
Dixon et al., our procedure allowed the sub-
ject to purchase control and risk decrement 
concurrently, so the relative value of each 
could not be determined.  Future research 
might seek to isolate these variables and as-
sess their relative importance for people with 
different histories of gambling behavior. 
Although the current methodology im-
proved upon that of Dixon et al. (1998), this 
study is not without its limitations.  First, the 
practical exigencies of conducting the study 
limited the number of participants we could 
include.  Therefore, it is possible that there 
were differences between our experienced and 
inexperienced groups, but the small sample 
sizes precluded significant findings.  Our ef-
fect sizes were large for purchase of control 
(d = 1.06) and medium for decrement of risk 
(d = .452), which suggests that significant 
findings might have been obtained had the 
samples been larger (Hoyle, 1999).  However, 
our results might also have been influenced 
by the fact that we allowed people with SOGS 
scores lower than 4 to participate in our study, 
which might have mitigated differences be-
tween players. 
Second, although procedures were de-
signed to replicate a casino roulette game as 
closely as possible, it was clear to participants 
that they were in a university laboratory par-
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ticipating in an experiment.  Therefore, it is 
possible that the extra stimulus conditions al-
tered typical betting behavior. Almost all the 
participants overtly wondered about the pur-
pose of the study. In fact, one of the expe-
rienced participants even claimed that the 
study’s purpose was to examine his strategy 
for playing roulette.  It is also worth noting 
that participants were not betting with their 
own money, and that betting behavior might 
have been different if their own money was at 
stake (cf., Weatherly & Brandt, 2004).   De-
spite these limitations, most of the partici-
pants reported that they would have placed 
the same or similar types of bets if they play-
ing roulette in a casino.  Given these self re-
ports, it is plausible that the results obtained 
are accurate reflections of the participant’s 
beliefs about their abilities to control the 
game, even though evidence of these beliefs 
was sometimes subtle. 
Third, we only assessed illusion of con-
trol on the game of roulette.  Further replica-
tions of this and related research (e.g., Dan-
newitz & Weatherly, 2007) might address 
whether illusions of control tend to be more 
probable with particular games. 
A fourth limitation is that we excluded 
participants with SOGS scores higher than 4.  
Although it was not our intention to study il-
lusions of control in pathological gamblers 
relative to non-pathological gamblers, it is not 
a minor point that individuals with high 
SOGS scores are more likely to engage in ac-
tivities that cause difficulties for them and 
their families.  Thus, more research is needed 
to determine the generality of responding of 
university undergraduates and “casual” gam-
blers to those with serious gambling prob-
lems.   
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DO THE RISK FACTORS FOR PATHOLOGICAL GAMBLING 
PREDICT TEMPORAL DISCOUNTING? 
 
Jeffrey N. Weatherly, Adam Derenne, and Samantha Chase 
University of North Dakota 
 
Weatherly and Dixon (2007) proposed that gambling was related to the increase 
in how individuals discount delayed (monetary) consequences and that several 
of the known risk factors for pathological gambling may serve as establishing 
operations or setting events that lead to such changes.  The present study tested 
these predictions by having participants complete a paper-and-pencil discount-
ing task involving hypothetical monetary consequences and determining wheth-
er self-reported measures of the known risk factors would significantly predict 
participants’ rate of discounting.  None of the risk factors served as significant 
predictors of discounting.  Interestingly, however, the rate of discounting varied 
systematically as a function of the number of preference reversals participants 
displayed at particular delays.  The present findings suggest that, if Weatherly 
and Dixon’s proposal is correct, then it likely needs to be assessed using a more 
diverse sample than college freshmen.  The results also suggest that measures of 
discounting may vary systematically as a function of procedure, which may call 
for a reevaluation of how discounting data are interpreted. 
Keywords: Delay discounting, Gambling, Risk factors 
____________________ 
 
Although many different theories have 
been forwarded for why people gamble and/or 
become pathological gamblers (see Petry, 
2005, for a review), no universally accepted 
explanation has yet emerged.  Weatherly and 
Dixon (2007) proposed an integrative beha-
vioral model for gambling based on behavior-
analytic principles.  Unlike many past beha-
vioral accounts for gambling behavior, the 
model proposed by Weatherly and Dixon 
went beyond contingency-driven factors such 
as intermittent schedules of reinforcement.  
Rather, the model relied on differences in 
how gamblers discount delayed conse-
quences, focused on the consequences that 
maintain gambling, and incorporated verbal 
behavior. 
___________ 
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 Delay discounting occurs when the sub-
jective value of a consequence is reduced be-
cause it is delayed in time.  For instance, 
when given a choice between receiving some 
sum of money today and receiving the exact 
same sum of money one year from today, all 
but the rare individual would choose to re-
ceive the money immediately.  Thus, the de-
lay of one year reduces the value of that sum 
of money below its current value. 
 Delay discounting has relevance to the 
study of gambling and gambling problems 
because research suggests that pathological 
gamblers discount delayed rewards at a great-
er rate than do non-pathological gamblers 
(e.g., Dixon, Marley, & Jacobs, 2003; see 
Madden et al., 2007, or Petry, 2005, for re-
views).  In other words, delayed conse-
quences have less control over the behavior of 
the pathological gambler than of the non-
pathological gambler.  This finding is consis-
tent with the idea that the factors that control 
delay discounting may also contribute to the 
formation of pathological gambling.  Howev-
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er, it is also possible that the disorder of pa-
thological gambling precedes changes in how 
the individual discounts delayed rewards.  In 
other words, although it is possible that how 
one discounts delayed rewards contributes to 
pathological gambling, it is also possible that 
one’s experience as a pathological gambler 
contributes to how one discounts delayed re-
wards.  As is always the case with correla-
tional data, it is also possible that some other, 
yet unidentified variable could produce both 
rapid discounting and a tendency toward pa-
thological gambling. 
 Even if delay discounting contributes to 
pathological gambling, it is not immediately 
clear what circumstances would cause a 
change in how a person discounts delayed re-
wards and thus makes him or her more sus-
ceptible to becoming a pathological gambler.  
Weatherly and Dixon (2007) proposed a me-
chanism by suggesting that several of the 
known risk factors for pathological gambling 
(i.e., age, gender, socioeconomic status (SES), 
marital status, ethnic minority status; see Pe-
try, 2005, for a full discussion of the risk fac-
tors) may functionally serve as establishing 
operations (Michael, 1993) or setting events 
(Kantor & Smith, 1975).  These factors may 
alter the consequences of gambling and 
change, directly or indirectly, how individuals 
discount delayed rewards.  Weatherly and Di-
xon further speculated that pathological gam-
bling would be related to a specific conse-
quence of gambling, the attainment of money, 
more so than other consequences (e.g., atten-
tion, sensory experience, escape; see Wea-
therly & Dixon, 2007, for a complete discus-
sion). 
 A positive aspect of Weatherly and Di-
xon’s proposal is that it can be tested inde-
pendently of pathological gambling.  If these 
factors are serving as establishing operations 
or setting events, then it should be possible to 
demonstrate that they are related to the rate 
that individuals discount delayed rewards re-
gardless of whether or not those individuals 
are pathological gamblers.  Furthermore, it 
should be possible to demonstrate that the rate 
that individuals discount delayed rewards is 
related to the consequences that maintain 
gambling in those individuals. 
 The present study was an attempt to test 
these possibilities.  Participants were asked to 
make a series of hypothetical choices between 
a certain amount of money available imme-
diately and $1,000 available after a delay.  
Participants’ answers were used to calculate 
how steeply they discounted delayed rewards.  
Regression analyses were then performed to 
determine whether the risk factors for gam-
bling were significant predictors of partici-
pants’ delay discounting.  Further analyses 
were conducted to determine if participants’ 
discounting could predict whether or not par-
ticipants’ gambling behavior was controlled 
by the attainment of money. 
If Weatherly and Dixon’s (2007) model 
is correct, then the risk factors for pathologi-
cal gambling should be significant predictors 
of delay discounting and how steeply one dis-
counts delayed rewards should be associated 
with the monetary consequences of gambling.  
Furthermore, it should be possible to discover 
whether one or more of these factors is a 
greater predictor of differences in delay dis-
counting than are other factors.  Should this 
outcome be true, then researchers and treat-
ment providers alike would have reason to 
focus their efforts on certain risk factors rela-
tive to the others. 
 
METHOD 
Participants 
The participants were 236 undergraduate 
students enrolled at the University of North 
Dakota.  Participants were recruited from 
lower-level psychology courses and received 
extra course credit for their participation.  The 
demographic information pertaining to the 
participants can be found in table 1. 
Participants were asked to complete a se-
ries of questionnaires after providing in
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Table 1 
Demographic information of the omnibus sample 
      
      
Gender 101 Males 135 Females    
      
Age Mean = 20.89 years (SD = 7.23) Range = 18-67 years  
      
Ethnicity 9 Hispanic 19 American Indian 1 Asian 1 African American 
 2 Native Hawaiian, Pacific Islander 204 Caucasian   
      
SES 183 <$10,000 15 $10,000-$14,999 13 $15,000-$24,999 
 7 $25,000-$34,999 4 $35,000-$49,000 9 $50,000-$74,999 
 3 $75,000-$99,999 2 >$100,000  
      
SOGS Mean = 1.17 (SD = 2.12) Range: 0 – 10  
GFA Tangible Mean = 8.08 (SD = 8.94)  Range: 0 – 25  
    
 
formed consent.  The first was a demographic 
questionnaire that ascertained the partici-
pant’s sex, age, marital status, race/ethnicity, 
and annual income.  These factors were as-
sessed because Weatherly and Dixon (2007) 
proposed that they are potentially establishing 
operations or setting events for pathological 
gambling. 
 The second measure was the Gambling 
Functional Assessment (GFA; Dixon & John-
son, 2007).  The GFA is a 20-item question-
naire that attempts to assess the consequences 
that may be maintaining the respondent’s 
gambling behavior.  The four potential conse-
quences for gambling are gaining attention, 
for the sensory experience, a tangible out-
come (e.g., winning money), and as an es-
cape.  Participants can score between 0 – 30 
in each of these categories.  Theoretically, the 
strength of the controlling consequence in-
creases with score and the highest scoring 
category represents the primary consequence 
maintaining gambling behavior.  The present 
study focused on participants’ score in the 
tangible category because it is this conse-
quence that Weatherly and Dixon (2007) pro-
posed as being important in the formation and 
maintenance of pathological gambling. 
 The third measure was the South Oaks 
Gambling Screen (SOGS; Lesieur & Blume, 
1987).  The SOGS is a 20-item questionnaire 
that attempts to assess the person’s history 
with gambling.  It is the most widely used 
screening measure for pathological gambling 
(see Petry, 2005).  Scores can range from 0 - 
20, with a score of 5 or more indicating the 
potential presence of pathology. 
 The final measure was a series of hypo-
thetical choices between a certain amount of 
money available immediately ($1, 50, 100, 
250, 500, 750, 900, 950, or 1,000) or $1,000 
available after some delay (one week, two 
weeks, one month, six months, one year, three 
years, or ten years).  Thus, participants made 
(by circling their preferred option) 63 hypo-
thetical choices.  The choices were presented 
in random order (i.e., the size of the imme-
diate reward and the delay to the $1,000 va-
ried from choice to choice).  The choices were 
presented in list fashion, one after the other, 
on a total of three sheets of paper. 
 
Analyses   
To determine the extent to which indi-
vidual participants discounted delayed re-
wards, the point that the participant switched 
from preferring the immediate reward to the 
delayed reward was determined for each de-
lay.  Because participants were faced with 
every possible monetary comparison at each 
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different delay presented in random order (vs. 
presenting the comparisons in linear order at a 
particular delay until the participant’s prefe-
rence switched and then moving on to the 
next delay), it was possible for participants to 
reverse preference more than once at a given 
delay (i.e., display multiple “changeover” 
points at a particular delay).  Three data sets 
were therefore created.  The first was the sub 
sample of the 236 participants who only had a 
single preference reversal or changeover point 
at each of the seven delays (n = 83; 44 female, 
39 male).  The second was the sub sample of 
the 236 participants who had displayed mul-
tiple changeover points at none or one par-
ticular delay (n = 141; 77 female, 64 male).  
At the hypothetical delay for which a partici-
pant displayed multiple changeover points, 
value at that delay was determined by calcu-
lating the mean between the two changeover 
values.  The third sub sample was of partici-
pants who displayed multiple changeover 
points at two or fewer delays (n = 178; 103 
females, 78 males).  When multiple chan-
geover points occurred, value was determined 
as described above.  Participants who dis-
played multiple changeover points at three or 
more delays (n = 58) were ultimately ex-
cluded from the analyses because they dis-
played inconsistency on nearly (or more than) 
half of the delays. 
Each data set was then subjected to two 
analyses related to delay discounting.  In each 
case, the delays were analyzed in terms of 
days (see Figure 1).  First, the following 
hyperbolic function was fit to each partici-
pant’s data: 
 
V = A / (1 + kD)
 
 
 
In Equation 1, V stands for the subjective 
monetary value of the delayed reward, A for 
the amount of the reward, k for a free parame-
ter that describes the rate at which discounting 
occurs, and D for the delay (e.g., Mazur, 
1987).  For the present study, k from Equation 
1 was calculated for each participant.  Larger 
values of k represent steeper rates of delay 
discounting.  Thus, k was used as a dependent 
measure for participants’ rate of discounting. 
 Equation 1 is theory bound because it 
makes certain assumptions about the nature of 
delay discounting (e.g., that discounting fol-
lows a hyperbolic function).  It is also the 
case that the distribution of the values of the 
parameters in Equation 1 is skewed.  Thus, a 
second analysis of discounting was per-
formed.  The area under the discounting curve 
was calculated using the changeover points 
for each participant (see Myerson, Green, & 
Warusawitharana, 2001).  This measure suf-
fers from neither of the above problems.  
With this measure, participants who steeply 
discounted delayed rewards would have 
smaller values of area under the curve (AUC) 
than would individuals who did not steeply 
discount delayed rewards. 
 Once Equation 1 and the area under the 
curve were determined for each participant’s 
data, several regression analyses were per-
formed.  Specifically, each participant’s age, 
gender, SES (defined by the participant’s self 
report of annual income measured on an or-
dinal scale), marital status (single, married, 
divorced, or widow/widower), ethnic minority 
status (Hispanic/Latino, American Indian, 
Asian, Black/African American, Native Ha-
waiian/Other Pacific Islander, or White) and 
SOGS score were numerically coded and used 
as predictor variables in a backward regres-
sion with either k or the area under the curve 
serving as the dependent variable.  This par-
ticular regression analysis was chosen be-
cause it determines each factor’s explanatory 
power independent of the other factors in the 
model.  These analyses tested the hypothesis 
that the risk factors for pathological gambling 
would predict how individuals discount de-
layed rewards. 
 Finally, for each data set, participants’ k 
or AUC values were used as predictor va-
riables for their cumulative score on the 
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“tangible” questions on the GFA (Dixon & 
Johnson, 2007).  These analyses tested the 
hypothesis that differences in how individuals 
discount delayed rewards would be predictive 
as to whether money served as the maintain-
ing consequence for gambling behavior. 
 
RESULTS 
 Figure 1 presents the discounting data for 
the mean of all participants in each of the 
three groups.  The solid line represents the 
best fit function using Equation 1.  The value 
of k for that fit is also presented in each graph.  
The results of the regression analyses con-
ducted on each data set, for both the value of 
k and the AUC, are presented in Table 2.  In 
no instance in the six analyses did partici-
pants’ age, gender, SES, marital status, eth-
nicity, or SOGS score serve as a significant 
predictor of either k or AUC, although in sev-
eral instances individual factors did approach 
significance.  Furthermore, the total variance 
accounted for by any individual factor was 
small, never exceeding 3%. 
 The k and AUC values for each data set 
presented in Figure 1 were also used as pre-
dictor variables for individuals’ “tangible” 
score on the GFA.  The results of these tests 
are presented in Table 3.  As can be seen in 
Table 3, neither k nor AUC was a significant 
predictor of participants’ “tangible” GFA 
score in any analysis.  Furthermore, the 
amount of variance for by either factor was 
negligible. 
 
DISCUSSION 
 Weatherly and Dixon (2007) suggested 
that several of the known risk factors for pa-
thological gambling may be serving as estab-
lishing operations or setting events that alter 
the value of the consequence maintaining 
gambling (i.e., money).  This alteration would 
lead individuals to discount delayed monetary 
rewards more steeply than when the risk fac-
tors are absent.  The present study attempted 
to test this suggestion by determining whether 
the risk factors would be significant predic-
tors of how participants discounted delayed 
monetary rewards.  None of the risk factors 
(nor participants’ scores on the SOGS) were 
predictive of participants’ level of discount-
ing. 
Weatherly and Dixon (2007) also sug-
gested that pathological gambling would be 
associated with one type of consequence, 
money.  Given that steep discounting is asso-
ciated with pathological gambling, the present 
study tested whether discounting would sig-
nificantly predict whether participants’ gam-
bling was maintained by monetary conse-
quences.  Participants’ discounting was not 
predictive of how strongly monetary conse-
quences maintained gambling behavior. 
Failing to find that the known risk factors 
for gambling are predictive of how steeply 
participants discount delayed rewards runs 
contrary to the predictions of Weatherly and 
Dixon (2007).  There are several possible ex-
planations for this failure.  For instance, the 
present sample consisted mostly of university 
freshmen and thus several of the risk factors 
related to pathological gambling, such as age, 
marital status, and SES, may have been artifi-
cially constrained.  Furthermore, because of 
the population of the upper Midwest of the 
United States, the present sample may have 
also provided a limited test of ethnicity. 
A remaining possibility is that Weatherly 
and Dixon’s view of the risk factors for pa-
thological gambling as potential establishing 
operations or setting events is incorrect.  For 
instance, one could argue that establishing 
operations or setting events operate at the lev-
el of individual participants whereas the risk 
factors for gambling are correlations that exist 
across a population.  Thus, one should not 
necessarily expect the risk factors to signifi-
cantly predict individuals’ discounting.  A full 
discussion of this issue is beyond the scope of 
the present paper.  However we would argue 
that such a view diminishes, if not eliminates, 
the value of risk factors if they can never be
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Figure 1.  Discount functions for participants dependent on the number of changeovers in 
responses 
 
used to predict individuals’ behavior. 
 The present data also failed to support 
Weatherly and Dixon’s (2007) prediction that 
pathological gambling is associated both with 
steep discounting and to one type of conse-
quence for gambling, money.  Again, it is 
possible that Weatherly and Dixon’s proposal 
was incorrect.  It is also possible that the fail-
ure to observe this relationship was related to 
the potential problems with the sample (see 
above).  Another potential reason for this fail-
ure is the measure used to determine the con-
sequences maintaining participants’ gam-
bling.  Although Dixon and Johnson (2007) 
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Table 2 
Results from the regression analyses conducted on the data used to construct Figure 1. 
No Changeovers  DV = k 
Factor Coefficient Beta Weight t Significance Semi-Partial R
2
 
Age   .000 -.009 -.058 .954 .000 
Gender  -.002 -.107 -.865 .390 .010 
SES  .000 -.035 -.266 .791 .001 
Marital Stat.  .000  .018  .003 .910 .000 
Ethnicity  .000  .020  .162 .871 .000 
SOGS  .000  .038  .318 .752 .001 
No Changeovers DV = AUC 
Age   .008 .165 1.045 .300 .013 
Gender   .084 .178 1.479 .143 .027 
SES -.013 -.105 -.822 .413 .008 
Marital Stat. -.016 -.093 -.594 .554 .004 
Ethnicity  .023 .158 1.325 .189 .022 
SOGS  .021 .148 1.248 .216 .019 
One or less Changeovers DV = k 
Age   .000  .119  .997 .321 .007 
Gender  -.001 -.022 -.248 .805 .018 
SES -.001 -.071 -.708 .480 .006 
Marital Stat.  .000  .021  .196 .845 .004 
Ethnicity  .000 -.005 -.049 .961 .007 
SOGS -.001 -.056 -.621 .536 .007 
One or Less Changeovers DV = AUC 
Age  -.006 -.162 -1.406 .162 .013 
Gender   .084  .158  1.886 .061 .024 
SES  .002  .015  .152 .879 .000 
Marital Stat. -.004 -.025 -.236 .814 .000 
Ethnicity  .022  .137  1.480 .141 .015 
SOGS  .013  .100  1.147 .253 .009 
Two or Less Changeovers DV = k 
Age   .000  .085  .827 .409 .004 
Gender   .000 -.012 -1.56 .876 .000 
SES -.001 -.081 -.901 .369 .005 
Marital Stat.  .001  .061  .649 .517 .002 
Ethnicity  .000 -.012 -.143 .887 .000 
SOGS  .000 -.053 -.675 .500 .003 
Two or Less Changeover DV = AUC 
Age  -.004 -.099 -.982  .327 .005 
Gender   .074  .136 1.808  .072 .018 
SES  .017  .093 1.054  .293 .006 
Marital Stat. -.014 -.078 -.840  .402 .004 
Ethnicity  .016  .099 1.157  .249 .007 
SOGS  .012  .085 1.101  .272 .007 
      
 
 
designed the GFA to measure weather “tangi-
ble” outcomes were maintaining gambling 
behavior, recent evidence suggests that the 
GFA may identify whether positive rein-
forcement is maintaining gambling behavior, 
but may not necessarily accurately delineate 
between the potential positively reinforcing 
consequences (e.g., tangible vs. sensory expe-
rience; Miller, Meier, Muehlenkamp, & Wea-
therly, in press).  
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Table 3 
Results from the regression analyses when k or AUC were used to predict participants’ “tangi-
ble” score on the GFA for each of the three datasets. 
No Changeovers 
Factor Coefficient Beta Weight t Significance Semi-Partial R
2
 
k -.29.956 -.035 -.319 .750 .001 
AUC    2.040  .054  .488 .627 .003 
One or Less Changeovers 
k 54.950  .118 1.405 .162 .014 
AUC  -.126 -.004 -.043 -.043 .000 
Two or Less Changeovers 
k 56.411 .112 1.515 .132 .013 
AUC     .815 .025  .338 .736 .001 
      
 
The present data also highlight another, 
unexpected reason why our hypotheses were 
not supported.  Namely, the procedure used in 
the present study to determine participants’ 
delay discounting did not reliably produce a 
single preference reversal at each delay.  It 
did, however, produce reliable changes in 
rates of discounting as a function of the num-
ber of multiple preference reversals partici-
pants displayed at different delays.  This re-
sult may constitute the main contribution of 
the present paper. 
 Figure 1 demonstrates that how rapidly 
participants discounted the delayed monetary 
consequence increased as individuals who 
displayed multiple changeover points across 
the seven different tested delays were added 
to the sample.  Because the 83 participants 
who did not display multiple changeovers are 
included in the calculations for all three 
graphs, this increase in discounting is com-
pletely due to individuals who had multiple 
changeovers at one or two delay points.  Fur-
thermore, this change in discounting was not 
trivial.  The value of k increased 71% from 
the group displayed in the top graph of Figure 
1 to the group displayed in the bottom graph
1
. 
                                                 
1
 Given the changes in the rate of discounting across 
the graphs in Figure 1, one could legitimately ask 
whether participants who displayed no, one, or two 
multiple preference reversals represented distinct popu-
lations.  To test this possibility, the analyses outlined in 
The delay-discounting task in the present 
study consisted of 63 choice combinations.  
These choices were randomly ordered and 
participants answered all of them.  This me-
thod was chosen because randomly ordering 
the choices would theoretically guard against 
order effects.  Doing so also seemed to pro-
vide face validity in the sense that individuals 
are rarely faced with a series of choices that 
vary systematically along one continuum 
(e.g., amount) when all other factors remain 
constant (e.g., delay).  Rather, “real life” 
choices typically different along a number of 
continuums from choice to choice.  However, 
using the current procedure, the result was 
that the vast majority of participants displayed 
multiple preference reversals at one or more 
delays. 
                                                                            
the results were conducted using only those partici-
pants who displayed one or two multiple changeovers.  
These analyses yielded only one major change com-
pared to those presented in the results.  Specifically, 
age and marital status were significant predictors of k 
for those individuals who displayed multiple prefe-
rence reversals at two (and only two) delays.  Dis-
counting tended to be steeper for younger and single 
participants.  The predictive relationship of ethnicity 
approached, but did not reach, significance (p=.054).  
None of the risk factors were significant predictors of 
AUC.  Furthermore, none of the risk factors were sig-
nificant predictors of k or AUC for those participants 
who displayed one (and only one) multiple preference 
reversal. 
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The procedure used to ascertain partici-
pants’ rate of delay discounting in the present 
study is not the only one that has been used.  
Ostaszewski, Green, and Myerson (1998), for 
instance, had participants respond to a series 
of choices at a particular delay with the 
amount of the immediate option varying sys-
tematically in either an ascending or descend-
ing sequences.  Participants in this study ex-
perienced both sequences across the proce-
dure, a practice recommended by some (e.g., 
Critchfield & Kollins, 2001).  Du, Green, and 
Myerson (2002), on the other hand, used an 
adjusting procedure in which participants 
were originally presented with an immediate-
ly available amount that was a certain percen-
tage of the delayed amount.  Depending on 
the participant’s choice, the next immediately 
available amount was adjusted upwards or 
downwards and this process continued until a 
changeover point was determined for that par-
ticular delay. 
Both of these techniques make multiple 
changeover points improbable (although one 
could argue that a different changeover point 
could be established for ascending vs. des-
cending sequences or if the adjusting proce-
dure was repeated).  However, although these 
procedures avoid the problem that occurred in 
the present procedure, they are highly artifi-
cial.  The systematic nature of presenting the 
questions creates order effects.  In fact, one 
could argue that the intention is to create an 
order effect. 
However, before one dismisses the 
changes in the present data as procedural arti-
facts, it is worthy of noting that an alternative 
interpretation exists.  That is, the individuals 
who displayed multiple changeovers may not 
have done so because of the procedure, but 
rather because these individuals were insensi-
tive to the presented choices relative to indi-
viduals who did not display multiple chan-
geovers.  Representing discounting for these 
individuals as a single function may thus be 
potentially misleading.  In other words, these 
individuals may have had a range of indiffe-
rence points at each delay, not a single one.  
This idea is worth exploring in the future.  
Individuals who display this “range” of indif-
ference may be unique relative to individuals 
who do not.  Furthermore, such an interpreta-
tion may alter conclusions that are drawn 
from studies of delay discounting in general. 
 A final procedural aspect that requires 
addressing is the fact that the present proce-
dure, and the procedures used in myriad pub-
lished studies, asked participants to make hy-
pothetical choices.  It is unclear how this fact 
influences the results.  Research from our la-
boratory (Weatherly & Brandt, 2004; Wea-
therly & Meier, 2007) has shown that partici-
pants in laboratory studies of gambling be-
come more conservative in their gambling as 
the value of what they are gambling increases.  
If the same result held true in studies of delay 
discounting of monetary rewards, then one 
would expect steeper discounting when hypo-
thetical, rather than “real,” choices were re-
quired. 
 The value of the present study may lie in 
the systematic changes in the main dependent 
variable as a function of whether a single pre-
ference reversal could be identified.  Given 
that researchers have made much ado about 
the association between delay discounting and 
pathological gambling, finding such systemat-
ic changes is a major concern.  Have those 
associations been based on data sets that con-
tain similar systematic changes?  Do proce-
dures designed to avoid these systematic 
changes result in a valid representation of the 
individuals’ delay discounting?  Do multiple 
changeovers represent ranges of indifference 
rather than a particular value of a delayed 
consequence?  Do hypothetical choices gene-
ralize to actual choices?  Does discounting 
measured in the laboratory accurately predict 
how the individual actually behaves?  These 
questions, and many additional ones, are wor-
thy of further investigation. 
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SLOT-MACHINE PREFERENCES AND SELF-RULES 
 
Terje Fredheim, Kai-Ove Ottersen, & Erik Arntzen 
Akershus University College
 
 
The present study was a replication and extension of Zlomke and Dixon (2006) 
investigating the impact of contextually trained discriminations on slot-machine 
gambling. In each of two experiments, 20 participants were exposed to two con-
currently available slot-machines differing only in color. Thus, Experiment 1 
was a replication, while in Experiment 2 we included an instruction to ensure 
that the participants attended to all of the onscreen stimuli. Following a pretest 
of slot machine preferences, a nonarbitrary relational training and testing proce-
dure was used to establish contextual functions of MORE-THAN and LESS-
THAN for two cues. After relational training the participants were exposed to a 
posttest identical to the pretest. The results of Experiment 1 showed that only a 
small number of the participants allocated their posttest responses to the slot 
machine that shared nonarbitrary properties with the contextual cue for MORE-
THAN. In Experiment 2, the posttest showed that an increased number of partic-
ipants who reported having attended to the contextual stimulus increased their 
preference to gamble on the yellow slot machine. 
Keywords: Gambling, slot-machines, non-arbitrary relational training, self-
rules, transformation of functions, instructions. 
_____________________ 
 
There has been an increase in gambling 
related problems over the last decade. The 
literature describes a prevalence of pathologi-
cal gambling usually between 1-3%, but some 
studies report prevalence rates up to 10% 
(e.g., Petry, 2005). Oren and Bakken (2007) 
found that about 0.7% of people aged be-
tween 16 and 75 years in Norway reported 
gambling problems. However, it is important 
to be aware that there are no casinos in Nor-
way. Thus, Norwegian gamblers may partici-
pate in different betting games hosted by 
Norsk Tipping, a governmental company that 
control gambling in Norway. A Norwegian 
study showed that slot-machines were a high-
ly preferred form of gambling:  61% of the 
total amount of money spent on gambling was 
related to slot machines (Oren & Bakken, 
__________ 
Address Correspondence to: 
Erik Arntzen 
Akershus University College 
P.O. Box 423, 2001 
Lillstrom, Norway 
Email: erik.arntzen@equivalence.net 
2007; Stiftelsestilsynet, 2006). 
The behavior analytic approach to under-
standing gambling is a growing field. Thus, 
many authors have argued that a behavioral 
model of gambling would extend and help us 
to understand variables related to gambling. 
Furthermore, such an approach would make 
possible effective treatment for pathological 
gamblers (Dixon, 2007; Ghezzi, Lyons, Di-
xon, & Wilson, 2006). There are several va-
riables that seem to be important for the un-
derstanding and analysis of gambling beha-
vior. For example, gambling behavior will 
occasionally lead to reinforcement. A well-
known fact is that behavior maintained by in-
termittent reinforcement is known to have a 
high, stable response rate and resistance to 
__________ 
The two first authors are now affiliated at Hedmark 
Habilitation Services 
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extinction (Ferster & Skinner, 1957). Inter-
mittent reinforcement can be one of several 
reasons why people continue gambling and it 
seems important to find out why people 
choose to gamble on specific slot machines or 
other games. Factors like stimulus control, 
contextual control by sound, light or colors 
and verbal behavior must be manipulated and 
analyzed to see if these factors can control 
and predict gambling behavior.  
Gambling behavior leads to many prob-
lems and therefore, it is important to find out 
more about the variables that lead to or main-
tain gambling and pathological gambling in 
order to help people suffering from problems 
related to gambling. Experiments with people 
in real gambling environments could, of 
course, give us relevant knowledge, but it is 
difficult to conduct experiments with partici-
pants’ own money, mainly for ethical reasons. 
With respect to problems with generalization, 
we might simulate gambling in controlled set-
tings, using technological solutions and artifi-
cial reinforcers, even though this is far from a 
real gambling situation (Weatherly & Meier, 
2007; Weatherly & Phelps, 2006). By using 
recreational gamblers as participants, experi-
ments with simulated gambling have been 
conducted by some researchers (e.g., Daugh-
erty & MacLin, 2007; Dixon & Schreiber, 
2002; MacLin, Dixon, & Hayes, 1999; Wea-
therly, Austin, & Farwell, 2007).  
For instance, Zlomke and Dixon (2006) 
conducted an experiment showing that slot-
machine gambling can come under contextual 
control by using conditional discrimination 
training. First, the participants gambled on 
simulated slot-machines on a PC (MacLin, 
Dixon, Robinson, & Daugherty, 2006). Nine 
participants could chose between two concur-
rently available slot-machines differing only 
in the colors, yellow and blue. After playing 
the slot-machines, the participants were 
trained to choose a comparison stimulus 
greater than the sample stimulus with a yel-
low contextual cue present, and to choose a 
comparison stimulus less than the sample sti-
mulus with a blue contextual cue present. 
Lastly, the participants were presented with 
the same simulated slot-machines. The results 
showed that eight of nine participants allo-
cated most of their responses to the yellow 
slot machine after conditional discrimination 
training.  
Recently, two studies have tried to replicate 
Zlomke and Dixon’s (2006) findings. The 
first study by Hoon, Dymond, Jackson, and 
Dixon (2007) reported mixed success with 
several variations of the original training pro-
cedure. The second study by Hoon, Dymond, 
Jackson, and Dixon (2008) replicated Zlomke 
and Dixon (2006), although the change in pre-
ferences was not as strong. Despite the small 
differences in subsequent replications and ex-
tensions, Zlomke and Dixon (2006) argued 
that self-rules acquired through conditional 
discrimination training can maintain certain 
responses related to slot machine gambling. 
Their explanation was related to transforma-
tion of functions (see Dymond & Rehfeldt, 
2000), which is said to occur when the func-
tions of one stimulus are altered or trans-
formed by virtue of the derived relation be-
tween it and another stimulus. The differing 
procedures employed and results obtained 
from the Hoon et al. (2007, 2008) studies in-
dicates that more research needs to be con-
ducted to contribute to a better understanding 
of transformation of functions related to gam-
bling behavior. 
The purpose of the current study was to 
run two experiments with a Norwegian sam-
ple of participants by manipulating two con-
textual cues. In the first experiment, we 
wanted to replicate and further extend the 
study of Zlomke and Dixon (2006). In the 
second experiment, we introduced an instruc-
tion to ensure that the participants attended to 
all the stimuli on the screen.  
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EXPERIMENT 1  
METHOD 
Participants 
Twelve women and eight men over 18 
years old, all students or fulltime workers, 
participated in this experiment. Everyone re-
ported knowledge of slot machines. None re-
ported any gambling problems. The two first 
authors recruited participants, and participa-
tion was voluntary. Everyone was told that 
they could withdraw from the experiment 
whenever they wanted to do so. After the ex-
perimental session, participants received a 
booklet about behavior analysis. 
 
Apparatus and setting 
The experimental sessions took place in 
small rooms (3.5 meters by 4 meters) contain-
ing a chair, a desk, office equipment and a 
computer. Participants were alone in the room 
during the experiment, but one or both of the 
two first authors were available for questions 
in the room next door. A computer controlled 
presentation of stimuli and data collection. 
The software program was made by Mark Di-
xon and coworkers in Microsoft® Visual Ba-
sic 6.0, but we used Microsoft® Visual Basic 
2008 Express Edition to run it. Three IBM-
compatible laptops, one containing an Intel® 
Pentium® M 1,73 GHz processor and 512 
MB RAM, and two containing an Intel® Pen-
tium® 1.66 GHz processor and 512 MB RAM 
ran the Microsoft Windows XP Professional 
operating system, version 2002 with Service 
Pack 2 were used in the experiment. 
 
Procedure 
Slot-Machine Task Pretest. The purpose of 
this pretest was to acquire baseline data on 
participants’ response allocation toward two 
simulated slot-machines that were equal con-
cerning pay-off probability and reinforcement 
magnitude, but differed in color. One of the 
slot-machines was yellow, and the other slot-
machine was blue. This phase of the experi-
ment started with the following instructions 
displayed on the computer screen (the text in 
Norwegian was available on the table beside 
the PC):  
 
On the following screen you will see a but-
ton in the middle of the screen. When you 
click on the button with your mouse, two 
slot machines will be revealed. Click your 
mouse on the slot machine you would like to 
play and earn as many points as possible. 
 
The experimenter answered any questions 
by repeating the instructions in Norwegian 
and then left the room. Then, two buttons 
were presented on the screen. One of the but-
tons was blue with the text “Slot Machine 1”, 
and the other button was yellow with the text 
“Slot Machine 2”. The buttons were approx-
imately 4 x 8 cm. A mouse click on either 
button resulted in the presentation of a slot-
machine with the same color as the button 
selected. Each participant started a trial by 
clicking a button with the text “Spin”. Click-
ing the spin-button resulted in spinning the 
machine reels for approximately 3s and one 
credit being subtracted from the participants 
“cumulative credits” (initially set at 100). 
Three identical symbols on the payoff line 
resulted in two credits added to “cumulative 
credits” and the text “AWESOME… YOU 
WIN!!” presented on the screen. Any other 
variation on the pay-off line resulted in re-
moval of the initially bet credit.  
A button with the text “Press HERE to 
continue” was presented on the screen, and by 
clicking this button trials were repeated as 
described above. To avoid the possibility for 
position bias, the blue and yellow buttons 
were randomly positioned on either side of 
the screen across trials. In addition, an ob-
server response was instated between all tri-
als, by the presentation of a button with the 
text “Click here”. 
Each slot-machine was programmed on a 
RR schedule of reinforcement with a proba-
bility of reinforcement of .5 and the magni-
tude of reinforcement was held constant. The 
RR sequence was generated by the program, 
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Figure 1.  Overview of the stimuli sets which were used in the conditional discrimination 
training and tests. 
 
and resulted in identical sequences and densi-
ty of trial outcomes for each participant, as 
well as identical amount of reinforcers ob-
tained. Each participant ended this task after 
50 trials with 100 credits.  
Conditional Discrimination Training. Fol-
lowing the slot-machine pretest, conditional 
discrimination training was conducted to es-
tablish the relations of less than (blue) and 
greater than (yellow).  In this condition, the 
participants were instructed to choose one of 
three comparisons presented below a single 
sample stimulus, by mouse clicking one of the 
comparisons (i.e., only one of the three com-
parisons would be the correct one in presence 
of a sample stimulus). There was never two 
comparisons worth “more than” sample if the 
contextual cue indicated more than. Similarly, 
there was never two comparison worth “less 
than” the sample if the contextual cue indi-
cated less than. Six sets of five stimuli and 
two contextual cues were used during this 
procedure. Each of the six sets contained five 
images or words, and the contextual cue was 
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presented as a blue or yellow rectangle behind 
the comparisons.  
As shown in Figure 1, each of the six sets 
represented a continuum from least to most. 
Three of the sets was stimuli related to gam-
bling (playing cards, bills, and coins), while 
three of the sets not was related to gambling 
(letter grades on universities, placement in 
competitions, and written amounts). For ex-
ample, Set B included pictures of a Norwe-
gian ”50-oring” coin, ”1-krone” coin, ”5-
krone” coin, ”10-krone” coin and ”20-krone” 
coin. The pictures were approximately 5 x 5 
cm. The contextual cue was approximately 20 
x 8 cm.  
At the beginning of the conditional dis-
crimination training condition, the following 
instructions were presented on the screen (the 
text in Norwegian was available on the table 
beside the PC):  
 
You are going to see five images presented 
on your screen: one image on top, three on 
the bottom, and one larger image surround-
ing the three on the bottom. Your job is to 
choose one of the three images on the bot-
tom of your screen by clicking on it with the 
mouse. When you are correct, you will re-
ceive one point. Incorrect responses will not 
result in awarded points. Please try to earn 
as many points as you can. The more points 
you earn, the quicker you will finish. There 
will be parts of the experiment where feed-
back is not given. The computer is still 
keeping track of your responses so continue 
to do your best. Do you have any questions? 
 
The experimenter answered any questions 
by repeating the relevant part of the instruc-
tions in Norwegian and then left the room. 
During the training phases, a point counter 
was visible. The counter displayed the cumu-
lative points earned by each correct choice. In 
addition, a correct answer resulted in the text 
“Correct” and a 1 s chime. Incorrect choices 
resulted in the text “wrong” and a 1 s chord. 
The relations of greater than and less than 
were trained in three separate phases using 
three sets of stimuli. Number of trials to crite-
rion in training and test phase was pre-
programmed by Dixon and coworkers. There 
were no limits for number of trials for each 
participant, and participants were requested to 
leave if they did not reach mastery criterion.  
Less than. The purpose of this phase was 
to train the relation of less than. When the 
sample stimulus was presented, comparisons 
were presented with a blue contextual cue. A 
click on the comparison less than sample sti-
mulus resulted in the programmed positive 
consequence. A click on any other compari-
son resulted in the programmed negative con-
sequence. For example, when the ”5-krone” 
coin was shown as sample, with the ”1-krone” 
coin, the ”10-krone” coin and the ”20-krone” 
coin as comparisons, clicking the ”1-krone” 
coin would be the correct response in Phase 1. 
Stimuli from sets A, B, and C were randomly 
presented. Each block consisted of 30 trials, 
and 27 correct answers resulted in advance to 
the next phase. If this criterion was not met, 
the block of 30 trials was re-presented. 
Greater than. The purpose of this phase 
was to train the relation of greater than. When 
the sample stimulus was presented, compari-
sons were presented with a yellow contextual 
cue. A click on the comparison greater than 
sample stimulus resulted in the programmed 
positive consequence. A click on any other 
comparison resulted in the programmed nega-
tive consequence. For example, when the ”10-
krone” coin was shown as sample, with the 
”1-krone” coin, the ”5-krone” coin and the 
”20-krone” coin as comparisons, a click on 
the ”20-krone” coin would be the correct re-
sponse in Phase 2. Stimuli from sets A, B, and 
C were randomly presented. Each block con-
sisted of 30 trials, and 27 correct answers re-
sulted in advance to the next phase. If this cri-
terion was not met, the block of 30 trials was 
re-presented. 
Mixed less than and greater than. During 
this phase, blue and yellow contextual cues 
were presented randomly 30 times each in a 
60-trial block. A correct answer had to meet 
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Figure 2.  Percent of responses on the yellow slot machine in pre- and posttest in Experiment 
1. 
 
the criterion described in Phase 1 and 2. The 
same stimulus sets as used in Phase 1 and 2 
were used. Each block consisted of 60 trials, 
and 55 correct answers resulted in advance to 
the next phase. If this criterion was not met, 
the block of 60 trials was re-presented.  
Test. This phase consisted of 120 trials. 
In addition to stimulus sets A, B, and C, the 
novel stimulus sets D, E, and F were used to 
test if the trained relations between contextual 
cue and comparisons are applied to novel sti-
muli. The criterion for correct and incorrect 
choices was the same as in the past phases. 
Before the first trial in Phase 4, the following 
text was displayed on the screen: “You will 
no longer receive feedback following your 
responses. Continue to do the best you can. 
The computer is recording your score” 
(Available on the table was a Norwegian 
translation). No feedback or points were pro-
vided at any time during this test. The crite-
rion for completion of Phase 4 was 103 cor-
rect answers in a block of 120 trials. If this 
criterion was not met, Phase 3 (Mixed train-
ing) was re-presented. Completion of Phase 3 
then resulted in presentation of a 120-trial 
block in Phase 4, and so one until participants 
met criterion. 
 
Slot-Machine Task Posttest 
The purpose of this task was to determine 
whether the participants had changed their 
preferences and allocated their responses dif-
ferently than in the pretest. Participants were 
re-exposed to the exact same slot-machines 
and conditions as in the pretest. 
 
RESULTS 
Twelve participants reached the trials to 
criterion and finished Experiment 1 (see Fig-
ure 2). At pretest, participants chose the yel-
low slot-machine between 4% and 100% (M = 
55%, SD = 27.9). The blue slot-machine was 
chosen between 0% and 96% (M = 45%, SD = 
27.9) at pretest. These findings indicate that 
some of the participants showed a preference 
for one of the two slot-machines before condi-
tional discrimination training. Twelve partici-
pants who completed conditional discrimina-
tion training in Phase 1 took between one and 
seven blocks to meet criteria (M = 2), in 
Phase 2 from one to three blocks (M = 2), and 
in Phase 3  between one to four blocks
0
20
40
60
80
100
1 2 3 4 8 9 10 11 13 15 18 19
Participant Number
P
er
ce
n
ta
g
e 
o
f 
re
sp
o
n
se
s 
to
 t
h
e 
y
el
lo
w
 (
m
o
re
-t
h
an
) 
sl
o
t 
m
ac
h
in
e 
 .
  
  
  
 .
Pretest
Posttest
 SLOT MACHINE PREFERENCES 41 
Table 1 
Data from participants who failed to complete the experiment 
Experiment Participant Quit During 
Phase 
Number 
of training 
blocks in 
final 
phase 
Number of 
training 
trials 
in final 
phase 
Variation in number of 
correct responses in final 
phase 
Total num-
ber of min-
utes 
before re-
questing to 
leave 
Lowest - 
highest 
Mastery 
criteria 
1 5 3 11 644 32-40 55 101 
6 3 21 1240 37-48 55 136 
7 3 12 737 14-29 55 72 
12 2 13 397 10-20 27 69 
14 3 21 1272 30-40 55 121 
16 3 16 918 19-33 55 85 
17 4 3 349 87-97 103 120 
20 3 27 1611 20-34 55 176 
2 23 3 6 389 31-48 55 92 
28 4 2 909 39-60 103 133 
        
 
(M = 2).  All twelve participants reached the 
criterion in Phase 4 in one block. Only four of 
the twelve participants played more on the 
yellow slot-machine in the posttest; three par-
ticipants gambled equally on the slot-
machines in pre- and posttest, and five partic-
ipants gambled less on the yellow slot-
machine during posttest, as shown in Figure 
2. On average, the participants chose to play 
55% on the yellow slot-machine in the pretest 
and 62% on the yellow slot-machine in the 
posttest. A t-test indicated that the difference 
between pre- and posttest was not statistically 
significant (t (11) = 0.49, (α = 0.05)).   
Table 1 shows data for eight participants 
who chose to withdraw from the experiment 
before they had completed discrimination 
training. Session-length for these 8 partici-
pants ranged between 69 to 176 minutes (M = 
110 minutes), while the participants who 
completed the conditional discrimination 
training phase took only 35 minutes on aver-
age. In summary, 12 out of 20 participants 
completed all phases of the Experiment 1, but 
only 4 showed an increase in preference for 
the yellow slot machine at posttest. 
 
DISCUSSION 
The results from Experiment 1 did not rep-
licate the findings of the Zlomke and Dixon 
(2006) study. The participants in the current 
study showed much more variation in their 
allocation of responses between the slot- 
machines than participants in Zlomke and Di-
xon (2006). Our findings from the 12 partici-
pants who completed the experiment show an 
average increase in preference of 7% for the 
yellow slot-machine, while Zlomke and Di-
xon (2006) reported a 32% increase. There 
are several possible explanations for this. 
First, we used another version of the simu-
lated slot-machines. Our participants choose 
slot-machines by clicking yellow or blue qua-
drangle with the written words ”Slot Machine 
1” or ”Slot Machine 2”. Participants in 
Zlomke and Dixon (2006) choose between 
two concurrently slot-machines, and clicked 
the one they wanted to continue with for the 
gambling. The differences in procedures may 
not be essential since the total number of 
clicking-responses to access the preferred 
slot-machine were the same in both experi-
ments. Second, the version we used required 
at least 240 trials during conditional discrimi-
nation training. Zlomke and Dixon’s (2006) 
version required at least 136 trials. This indi-
cates that the participants in the current study 
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were exposed to more trials in the conditional 
discrimination training in training yellow col-
or to “more-than” than the participants in 
Zlomke and Dixon (2006). Nevertheless, the 
participants in the current study showed a 
lesser change in preference than in Zlomke 
and Dixon (2006). Third, we replaced the US 
training stimuli (pictures of money) with 
Norwegian training stimuli, we translated 
written words to Norwegian, and amount of 
money (US $) was calculated to Norwegian 
kroner (NOK). We did this to avoid unfami-
liarity with the training stimuli from influen-
cing the results. Fourth, verbal reports from at 
least one participant told us that it was possi-
ble for the participants to reach trials to crite-
rion for all phases in conditional discrimina-
tion training without paying attention to the 
contextual cue. This is possible because to 
avoid that more than one comparison stimulus 
could be “the right one” at the same time, on-
ly one of three comparisons would be “more-
than” or “less-than” sample stimulus, as 
pointed out in Hoon et al. (2007). Two com-
parisons would always be “the wrong ones”. 
Participants could choose the comparison that 
was the only one “more-than” or the only one 
“less-than” sample stimulus and receive feed-
back, and reach trials to criterion in all phas-
es, without noticing the color of the contex-
tual cue. Eight of twenty participants did not 
continue with the experiment after struggling 
to reach trials to criterion in the conditional 
discrimination training. In contrast, all nine 
participants in Zlomke and Dixon’s (2006) 
study met the criterion for conditional dis-
crimination training and finished the experi-
ment. 
It is possible that instructions could influ-
ence different types of attending behavior. 
Some studies have discussed the influence of 
general and specific instructions in condition-
al discrimination procedures (Arntzen, 
Vaidya, & Halstadtro, in press; Pilgrim, Jack-
son, & Galizio, 2000; Smyth, Barnes-Holmes, 
& Barnes-Holmes, 2008) and there is need for 
further research. Therefore, the purpose of 
Experiment 2 was to study the effects of extra 
instructions on the importance of attending to 
all stimuli on the screen. The instruction was 
given to the participants who did not reached 
trial to criterion within a time limit in training 
conditional discrimination. A short post-
experimental interview was conducted to de-
termine if participants noticed the contextual 
cue during the conditional discrimination 
training.  
 
EXPERIMENT 2 
                      METHOD 
Participants 
In the current experiment twenty adults 
participated, eleven women and nine men. 
Everyone was more than eighteen years old 
and had a full time job. All the participants 
said they had knowledge about slot machines, 
but no one reported when asked to have any 
gambling problems. The participants partici-
pated voluntarily and were recruited by the 
two first authors. Before the experimental ses-
sion started, everyone was told that they could 
withdraw from the session at any time. After 
the experiment, all participants received a 
booklet about applied behavior analysis. 
 
Procedure 
The procedure was the same as in Experi-
ment 1 except for two important differences. 
First, if a participant had not finished the ex-
periment after sixty minutes, the experimenter 
interrupted the study, repeated the start in-
struction and emphasized to the participant 
that they should attend to all the five different 
images on the screen. The experimenter 
pointed to the image on top of the screen, the 
three below and the large image that encom-
passed the three below to draw participants’ 
attention to the contextual cue of the back-
ground color.  Second, we conducted a brief 
interview with every participant who finished 
the experiment. The following question was 
asked: “How did you solve the task where 
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 Figure 3.  The upper panel shows the percent of responses on the yellow slot machine in pre- 
and posttest for the Color Group (the participants that reported to have attended to the contextual 
stimulus in the training phase) in Experiment 2. The lower panel shows the percent of responses 
on the yellow slot machine in pre- and posttest for the Number Group (the participants that re-
ported not to have attended to the contextual stimulus in the training phase) in Experiment 2. 
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you were going to choose between three im-
ages?” We asked the question to determine if 
the participants had attended to the color of 
the contextual stimulus or the number of 
comparison stimuli. 
 
RESULTS AND DISCUSSION 
Eighteen participants finished Experiment 
2. In the pretest, the choices for the yellow 
slot machine were from 0% to 94 % (M = 
48%, SD = 24.3), while the blue slot machine 
was chosen from 6% to 100% (M = 52%, SD 
= 24.3).  This finding indicates that some of 
the participants had a preference for one of 
the slot machines before the conditional dis-
crimination training was introduced. Thus, the 
finding is also in accordance with the results 
in Experiment 1.  
The eighteen participants who finished the 
conditional discrimination training in Phase 1 
took between one and nine sessions (M = 3 
sessions), between one and five sessions (M = 
2 sessions) in Phase 2, and between one and 
fifteen sessions (M = 3 sessions) in Phase 3. 
All participants, except for one, finished 
Phase 4 in one session. Participant #40 fi-
nished Phase 4 in two sessions. In Experiment 
1, twelve of twenty participants (60%) fi-
nished the experiment, while eighteen of 
twenty participants (90%) finished Experi-
ment 2 (see Table 1). Therefore, it seems rea-
sonable to presume that the detailed instruc-
tion was effective. Two of the participants in 
Experiment 2 did not finish the conditional 
discrimination training and were not exposed 
to the post-test. Participant #28 reached the 
criterion in Phase 3 two times, but did not 
reach the criterion in Phase 4. Thus, the par-
ticipant was not re-exposed to Phase 3 and did 
not finish the experiment.  
In the analysis of the results, the partici-
pants were divided into two groups dependent 
on the answers in the post-experimental inter-
view. That is, one group consisted of the par-
ticipants who reported that they had chosen 
the comparison stimulus by looking at the 
color of the contextual stimulus (Color 
Group), while the other group consisted of the 
participants who reported to have chosen the 
one comparison stimulus that was either 
greater or smaller than the sample stimulus, 
independent of the color of the contextual 
stimulus (Number Group). The Color Group 
consisted of twelve participants, eight of 
whom gambled more on the yellow slot ma-
chine in the posttest than in the pretest, as 
shown in Figure 3. One of the twelve partici-
pants gambled the same on the yellow and the 
blue slot machine in pretest and posttest. Fur-
thermore, three of the twelve participants 
gambled less on the yellow slot machine in 
the posttest. Participants # 21, 22, and 25 re-
ceived the detailed instruction. Participants in 
the Color Group gambled a mean of 49% of 
their responses on the yellow slot machine in 
the pretest and 69% on the yellow slot ma-
chine in the posttest. A t-test indicated a sta-
tistically significant difference: t (11) = 0.04 
(α = 0.05). This indicates that the procedure 
was effective in increasing preferences for the 
yellow slot machine, providing that the color 
of the contextual stimulus had been attended 
to.  
The Number Group consisted of six partici-
pants, two of whom gambled more on the yel-
low slot machine in the posttest than in the 
pretest, while four gambled less on the yellow 
slot machine. It is important to notice that par-
ticipants # 37, 38, and 39 were given detailed 
instruction and reported to have solved the 
task by looking at the comparison stimuli. 
Since the detailed instruction did not include 
information about attending to changes in the 
color of the contextual stimulus, it is possible 
that the instruction functioned as input to con-
tinue the experiment. The Number Group 
gambled with a mean of 47% of responses 
allocated to the yellow slot machine in the 
pretest and 41% in the post-test, as shown in 
Figure 3. A t-test indicated that the difference 
was not statistically significant: t (5) = 0.72 (α 
=0.05).
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Figure 4.  The Figure shows the mean number of responses to the yellow slot machine in 
pre-and posttest for both Experiment 1 and 2. Furthermore, the results are divided into Color 
Group and Number Group. 
 
The purpose of Experiment 2 was further 
to investigate the possible implication that 
some of the participants did not attend to the 
colors. We replicated the findings from Expe-
riment 1 as we did find a greater variation 
than Zlomke and Dixon (2006) in responding 
to the yellow slot machine in the pretest. The 
posttest shows that eight of twelve partici-
pants (Color Group) who reported to have at-
tended to the contextual stimulus increased 
their preference to gamble on the yellow slot 
machine (one participant responded the same 
in pre and posttest, while three participants 
gambled less on the yellow slot machine). As 
a group, these participants had the largest in-
crease in preference from pre- to posttest (see 
Figure 4) and nearly three times as great an 
increase in preference change as in Experi-
ment 1.  
 
 
   GENERAL DISCUSSION 
We sought to replicate Zlomke and Dixon 
(2006) and also to expand the knowledge 
about instructional control in the gambling 
literature. The results from Experiment 1 in 
the current study did not replicate all of the 
findings from Zlomke and Dixon (2006). 
First, during the pretest we found more varia-
bility among participants’ preferences for the 
slot machines. In the study by Zlomke and 
Dixon (2006), the greatest shift in preference 
was 20% for the yellow slot machine (M = 
49%). Thus, in the current study the shift in 
preferences ranged from 0% to 100% for the 
yellow slot machine (M = 51%). Second, the 
data from the posttest show that eight of the 
participant in the Zlomke and Dixon (2006) 
study played more on the yellow slot machine 
compared to the pretest. The participants in 
the current study did not show the same con-
sistency in change of preference. Only four of 
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the twelve participants who finished Experi-
ment 1 had an increase in preference for the 
yellow slot machine, and five participants 
showed a reduced preference for the yellow 
slot machine after the conditional discrimina-
tion training. Some of the participants re-
ported that they had not attended to the con-
textual stimulus, even if they finished the 
training and test phase. We think that this 
finding could be important since it might be 
that the participants had not conditioned the 
yellow color to the contextual stimulus “more 
than”. Furthermore, it could have implications 
for the interpretation of the results of Experi-
ment 1. One could not account for an increase 
in preferences on the yellow slot machine for 
the participants who have not attended to the 
contextual stimulus (i.e., if the color on the 
slot machines was not of importance, then the 
choices in both pre- and posttest will be large-
ly random).  
The change in preference for the Color 
Group is remarkably lower than in the 
Zlomke and Dixon (2006) study. One impli-
cation from the current study seems to be that 
it is important to find out if the participants 
are attending to the contextual stimulus or 
not. The group (Number Group) that had been 
looking at or attending to comparison stimuli 
showed a small reduction in change in prefe-
rence to the yellow slot machine after train-
ing.  
The results from the current study are in 
accordance with the results of Hoon et al. 
(2007), even if in the current study the 
changes in preferences were greater. Hoon et 
al. (2007) presented three experiments with 
six participants in each experiment. Group 
data from Experiment 1 showed 18% reduc-
tion in gambling on the yellow slot machine, 
while group data from Experiment 2 and Ex-
periment 3 showed a small increase of 4%. In 
an another study by Hoon et al. (2008), they 
showed that when we just look at group data 
an increase in preferences of  20% is ob-
served. They argued that establishment of 
non-arbitrary contextual control is most effi-
cient with two comparisons and gambling re-
lated stimuli. The results from Experiment 2 
in the current study, albeit with three compar-
isons, are in accord with this notion providing 
that we exclude the participants who reported 
not to have been attending to the contextual 
stimulus.   
Hoon et al. (2007) reported that 13 of 18 
participants finished the experiments. In the 
current study, all of the participants that fi-
nished both experiments showed one self-
generated rule that was important in the test 
phase in which three new stimulus sets were 
introduced. Therefore, we will argue that the 
rule about the five stimuli on the screen in 
training phase was controlling the partici-
pants’ behavior in the test phase. Further-
more, the self-generated rule was probably 
also used during the post-test for those who 
gambled more on the yellow slot machine in 
the pretest even if it did not produce more 
reinforcers. Thus, there are some problems 
with self-report data (e.g., Critchfield & Ept-
ing, 1998; Holth & Arntzen, 1998), such as 
the fact that participants’ self-generated rules 
are asked about in a post-experimental inter-
view and the questioning by itself could influ-
ence the self-reports. Therefore, we suggest 
that future research should include talk aloud 
procedures (e.g., Cabello & O'Hora, 2002; 
Rehfeldt & Dixon, 2000). The focus on self-
generated rules will be in accordance with 
researchers who have pointed out that analys-
es of different verbal behavior are important 
in understanding gambling behavior (Brandt 
& Pietras, 2008; Dixon & Delaney, 2006). 
Thus, it seems important to increase the un-
derstanding of self-generated rules in gam-
bling behavior since such rules like “play the 
yellow slot machines, and you will win 
more”. Such a rule may make individuals 
gamble more on yellow machines than ma-
chines with other colors. Thus, it could be that 
the gambler thinks he or she can control or 
have influence on the outcome of gambling 
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(e.g., Ladouceur, Sylvain, Boutin, & Doucet, 
2002; Petry, 2005). 
There are several limitations to the present 
findings. First, a potential threat to the validi-
ty of the findings is the relatively low re-
quirement of 50 slot machine trials in the 
pretest, which could be too few responses for 
the participants to show a stable preference. 
Also, the participants may have determined 
the schedules of reinforcement in the pretest 
and therefore have no reason for gambling 
more on the yellow slot machine in the post-
test. Second, although open-ended questions 
were used during the post-experimental inter-
view in Experiment 2, participants’ responses 
were readily assigned to one of two catego-
ries. This made it clear for the experimenter 
how to score the answers, but had all verbali-
zations been audio recorded and later tran-
scribed it would have allowed for reliability 
testing to be undertaken.  Third, we did not 
use a standardized measure for screening 
gambling problems. All the participants were 
given some formal written information about 
the experiment and they had to answer two 
questions about gambling. All participants 
reported knowledge of slot-machines, but no 
one reported problems with gambling. By this 
we concluded that the participants may best 
be described as “non-gamblers” or recreation-
al gamblers. A standardized measure like 
South Oaks Gambling Screen (SOGS) (Le-
sieur & Blume, 1987) may be better to screen 
and categorize participants. Fourth, employ-
ing a research design other than the pretest-
posttest design, such as a multiple baseline 
design, is important for future research, as is 
targeting the least preferred color slot ma-
chine from the pretest as the subsequent 
more-than contextual cue. Finally, it would be 
helpful to replicate the present procedures 
with gamblers.  
In conclusion, the current study showed 
that preferences for gambling on one of two 
slot machines could come under contextual 
control by two different colors. The results 
support the studies by Zlomke and Dixon 
(2006) and Hoon et al. (2007). There is a need 
for more replications since the results are not 
quite unambiguous. In any case, the results 
show that preference for slot machines can be 
established and transformed to other stimuli. 
Furthermore, the results showed that self-
generated rules can lead to responding in a 
special pattern even if the reinforcement for 
such responses is very lean and could be the 
reason for the choice of some responses and 
not other even if the contingencies of rein-
forcement are the same 
 
REFERENCES 
Arntzen, E., Vaidya, M., & Halstadtro, L. B. (in press). 
On the role of instruction in conditional 
discrimination training. Experimental Analysis of 
Human Behavior Bulletin. 
Brandt, A. E., & Pietras, C. J. (2008). Gambling on a 
simulated slot machine under conditions of 
repeated play. The Psychological Record, 58, 405-
426. 
Cabello, F., & O'Hora, D. (2002). Addressing the 
limitations of protocol analysis in the study of 
complex human behavior. International Journal of 
Psychology and Psychological Therapy, 2, 115-
130. 
Critchfield, T. S., & Epting, L. K. (1998). The trouble 
with babies and the value of bathwater: 
Complexities in the use of verbal reports as data. 
The Analysis of Verbal Behavior, 15, 65-74. 
Daugherty, D., & MacLin, O. H. (2007). Perceptions of 
luck: Near wins and near loss experiences. Analysis 
of Gambling Behavior, 1, 123-132. 
Dixon, M. R. (2007). Why behavior analysts should 
study gambling behavior. Analysis of Gambling 
Behavior, 1, 1-3. 
Dixon, M. R., & Delaney, J. (2006). The impact of 
verbal behavior on gambling behavior. In P. M.  
Ghezzi, C. A. Lyons, M. R. Dixon & G. R. Wilson  
(Eds.), Gambling: Behavior Theory, Research, and 
Application (pp. 127-154). Reno, NV: Context 
Press. 
Dixon, M. R., & Schreiber, J. B. (2002). Utilizing a 
computerized video poker simulation for the 
collection of data on gambling behavior. The 
Psychological Record, 52, 417-428. 
Dymond, S., & Rehfeldt, R. A. (2000). Understanding 
complex behavior: The transformation of stimulus 
functions. The Behavior Analyst, 23, 239-254. 
Ferster, C. B., & Skinner, B. F. (1957). Schedules of 
Reinforcement. New York: Prentice Hall, Inc. 
48 FREDHEIM, OTTERSEN, and ARNTZEN  
Ghezzi, P., Lyons, C. A., Dixon, M. R., & Wilson, G. 
R. (2006). Gambling: Behavior Theory, Research, 
and Application.  Reno, NV: Context Press 
Holth, P., & Arntzen, E. (1998). Symmetry versus 
sequentiality related to prior training, sequential 
dependency of stimuli, and verbal labeling. The 
Psychological Record, 48, 293-315. 
Hoon, A., Dymond, S., Jackson, J. W., & Dixon, M. R. 
(2007). Manipulating contextual control over 
simulated slot machine gambling. Analysis of 
Gambling Behavior, 1, 109-122. 
Hoon, A., Dymond, S., Jackson, J. W., & Dixon, M. R. 
(2008). Contextual control of slot machine 
gambling: Replication and extension. Journal of 
Applied Behavior Analysis, 41, 467-470. 
Ladouceur, R., Sylvain, C., Boutin, C., & Doucet, C. 
(2002). Understanding and treating the pathological 
gambler: Book review. Cognitive Behaviour 
Therapy, 31, 191. 
Lesieur, H. R., & Blume, S. B. (1987). The South Oaks 
Gambling Screen (The SOGS): a new instrument 
for the identification of pathological gamblers. 
American Journal of Psychiatry, 144, 1184-1188. 
MacLin, O. H., Dixon, M. R., & Hayes, L. J. (1999). A 
computerized slot machine simulation to investigate 
the variables involved in gambling behavior. 
Behavior Research Methods, Instruments & 
Computers, 31, 731-734. 
MacLin, O. H., Dixon, M. R., Robinson, A., & 
Daugherty, D. (2006). Writing a simple slot 
machine simulation program. In P. M. Ghezzi, C. 
A. Lyons, M. R. Dixon & G. R. Wilson (Eds.), 
Gambling: Behavior Theory, Research, and 
Application (pp. 127-154). Reno, NV: Context 
Press. 
Oren, A., & Bakken, I. J. (2007). Pengespill og 
pengespillproblem i Norge 2007. SINTEF Helse, 
avdeling for epidemologi, from 
http://www.sintef.no 
Petry, N. M. (2005). Pathological Gambling: Etiology, 
Comorbidity, and Treatment. Washington, DC: 
American Psychological Association American 
Psychological Association. 
Pilgrim, C., Jackson, J., & Galizio, M. (2000). 
Acquisition of arbitrarily conditional 
discriminations by young normally developing 
children. Journal of the Experimental Analysis of 
Behavior, 73, 177-193. 
Rehfeldt, R. A., & Dixon, M. R. (2000). Investigating 
the relation between self-talk and emergent 
stimulus relations. Experimental Analysis of Human 
Behavior Bulletin, 18, 28-29. 
Smyth, S., Barnes-Holmes, D., & Barnes-Holmes, Y. 
(2008). Acquired equivalence in human 
discrimination learning: The role of propositional 
knowledge. Journal of Experimental Psychology: 
Animal Behavior Processes, 34, 167-177. 
Stiftelsestilsynet, L.-o. (2006). Norske pengespel: 
Statistikk over norske pengespel og lotteri, from 
http://www.lottstift.no <http://www.lottstift.no> 
Weatherly, J. N., Austin, D. P., & Farwell, K. (2007). 
The role of “experience” when people gamble on 
three different video-poker games. Analysis of 
Gambling Behavior, 1, 34-43. 
Weatherly, J. N., & Meier, E. (2007). Studying 
gambling experimentally: The value of money. 
Analysis of Gambling Behavior, 1, 133-140. 
Weatherly, J. N., & Phelps, B. J. (2006). The Pitfalls of 
Studying Gambling Behavior in a Laboratory 
Situation. In P. M. Ghezzi, C. A. Lyons, M. R. 
Dixon & G. R. Wilson (Eds.), Gambling: Behavior 
Theory, Research, and Application (pp. 19-43). 
Reno, NV: Context Press. 
Zlomke, K. R., & Dixon, M. R. (2006). Modification of 
slot-machine preferences through the use of a 
conditional discrimination paradigm. Journal of 
Applied Behavior Analysis, 39, 351-361. 
 
Action Editor: Simon Dymond 
Analysis of Gambling Behavior 2008, 2, 49-54 Number 1 (Summer 2008) 
49 
 
 
USING PERFORMANCE FEEDBACK TO TEACH VIDEO POKER 
PLAYERS TO GAMBLE BETTER 
 
Mark R. Dixon & James W. Jackson 
Southern Illinois University 
 
The present investigation reports two studies that examined the performance of 
non-pathological recreational video poker gamblers.  In the first experiment, 
seven participants played three types of video poker games in a within partici-
pants randomized sequence design.  The percentage of errors made across games 
revealed the game variant “Deuces Wild” yielded more frequent mistakes than 
“Jacks or Better” or “Bonus Poker.”  The second experiment consisted of a new 
sample of 11 participants being exposed to “Deuces Wild” poker to initially 
assess error percentages.  Next, participants were all provided with performance 
feedback regarding their play, and finally the feedback was removed to assess 
performance maintenance.  Results suggest that all poker players were able to 
improve performance above baseline level, and changes were maintained when 
the intervention was removed.   
Key words: gambling, video poker, addiction, performance feedback, vid-
eo game 
____________________ 
 
In recent years behavior analysts have 
become more active in attempting to under-
stand the behavior of gambling and the unfor-
tunate  disorder of pathological gambling 
(e.g., Dixon, Jacobs, & Sanders, 2006; Wea-
therly & Dixon, 2007; Zlomke & Dixon, 
2006).    However, similar to the consumption 
of alcohol or drugs, not all those who partake 
in such libations develop a problem.  Instead, 
many individuals find themselves capable of 
managing consumption at healthy levels re-
sulting in no known detrimental consequences 
from their behavior.  The occasional cigar 
smoker, beer drinker, or wine taster is hardly 
considered pathological.  A similar distinction 
has been seen in the context of gambling.  
While reports suggest that over 80% of adults 
in the United States have gambled in their 
__________ 
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lives, only 1-3% of the population develops 
any pathology from gambling (Petry, 2005).  
For the remaining percentage, gambling may 
be considered a recreational activity like 
sports or a type of entertainment (Ghezzi, 
Lyons, & Dixon, 2000).    
 Paying more for the same gambling expe-
rience is similar to paying extra for movie 
tickets, sporting events, or a case of beer.  Of-
ten gamblers do in fact spend more money 
than necessary due to playing casino games 
poorly.  Casinos profit from the margin of er-
ror by patrons.  Optimal play will yield a 
house advantage of only 1-4%.  However, 
when errors are made by players the odds fa-
voring the casino can rise over 500% (Zam-
zow Software Solutions, 2006).   Performance 
feedback has been successful at improving 
skills such as the sports of rugby (Mellalieu, 
Hanton, & O’Brien, 2006), football (Smith & 
Ward, 2006), and basketball (Kladopoulos & 
McComas, 2001).  To date, the utility of per-
formance feedback has not been demonstrated 
in minimizing the many type of errors made 
by recreational gamblers.  Thus, the twofold 
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purpose of the present study was first to de-
termine the type of video poker game that 
would yield the most errors by players, and 
second to attempt to implement a perfor-
mance feedback intervention to reduce errors 
by players in the most error-prone game type.   
 
EXPERIMENT 1 
METHOD 
Participants, Setting, and Apparatus 
Seven undergraduate students partici-
pated in the current study for course extra 
credit and a potential $20  gift card to use to-
wards a local retailer awarded upon attaining 
the highest score among all participants.  Par-
ticipants consisted of 4 men and 3 women be-
tween the ages of 21 and 32 (M = 23.4, SD = 
3.87).  Upon completion of informed consent, 
participants were asked to complete three 
computer tasks, the first consisting of a basic 
demographics form with questions regarding 
gender, age, highest education level com-
pleted, and annual income.  The second task 
consisted of an electronic version of the South 
Oaks Gambling Screen (SOGS; Lesieur & 
Blume, 1987).  Any individual who scored a 5 
or more on this instrument (a measure of po-
tential pathological gambling) was dismissed 
from the study.  Participants were then asked 
to play three 15 minute sessions of video pok-
er using the video poker software WinPoker 
6.0 (Zamzow Software Solutions, 2006).  
Each session consisted of a different 5-card-
draw video poker variation (Jacks or Better, 
Bonus Poker, and Deuces Wild), and were 
presented in random order.  The three specific 
games were chosen based on prior research on 
video poker (Weatherly, Austin, & Farwell, 
2007).   
 
Procedure 
 Prior to running each participant, the ex-
perimenter determined the order of presenta-
tion of the three video poker games through a 
random drawing.  Upon completion of the 
demographic questionnaire and the SOGS, 
participants were given basic instruction on 
how to play video poker using the computer 
software.  Participants were then staked with 
300 credits and allowed to play the first video 
poker variation for 15 min.  Upon completion 
of the first 15-min session participants were 
given a 2-min break and asked to leave the 
room.   During this time the experimenter 
recorded data from the software’s session in-
formation screen.   
The software recorded the number times 
during the given session that the player de-
viated from optimal play.  Any deviation from 
optimal play represented either holding a card 
or failing to hold a card which based on the 
hand dealt and the payoff structure for the 
given game resulted in a lower than optimal 
rate of return.   Based on the number of hands 
played these errors are translated by the soft-
ware into a Percent Correct Play statistic 
which was used as the dependent measure in 
the current study.    
After recording the Percent Correct Play 
statistic, the experimenter reset all statistics to 
zero, reset the number of credits to 300, and 
switched the game to the next game variation 
in the sequence.  The participant was then al-
lowed to return and asked to complete another 
15-min session playing the new game.  These 
steps were repeated for the remaining game 
variations, and upon completion of the third 
15-min session the participant was debriefed 
and thanked for his or her participation. 
 
EXPERIMENT 1 
RESULTS AND DISCUSSION 
The results of Experiment 1 yielded mean 
Percentage Correct Play for Jacks or Better 
(M=56.12%, SD = 6.83), Bonus Poker (M= 
51.25%, SD = 8.13), and Deuces Wild (M= 
41.0%, SD = 8.15).  A repeated-measures 
ANOVA was conducted to support the visual 
inspection of differences across games and 
yielded significant mean differences (F (2, 12) 
= 9.683, p = .003), and no significance on or-
der of game presentation.  The observed dif-
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ferences between games supports prior re-
search on poker game error making (Weather-
ly et al., 2007) that has suggested that players 
make more mistakes on wild-card games than 
on  non-wild card games.  Future research 
should examine players’ relative preference 
for draw poker games such as Jacks or Better 
compared to wild card games such as Deuces 
Wild or other types of wild card games in a 
concurrent operant paradigm.   This type of 
preparation will allow for analysis of game 
preference and allow for error types made by 
players. 
 
EXPERIMENT 2 
METHOD 
Participants, Setting, and Apparatus   
 Eleven individuals participated in Expe-
riment 2 for course extra credit and potential 
$20 gift card.  Participants consisted of 1 male 
and 10 females ranging in age from 22 to 39 
(M = 24.8, SD = 4.8).  Participants completed 
an informed consent, demographics question-
naire, and the SOGS as described previously 
for Experiment 1.  No participants scored in 
the pathological range on the SOGS.   Partici-
pants were then asked to play a number of 5-
min sessions of Deuces Wild video poker on 
WinPoker 6.0.  Deuces Wild was chosen 
based on results of Experiment 1, which indi-
cated it was the game variant that produced 
the most errors. 
 
Procedure 
Participants were then given basic in-
structions on playing video poker as described 
in Experiment 1 and informed that they would 
be asked to play the game for 5-min sessions, 
at the end of which the experimenter would 
ask them to leave the room so that data could 
be collected.  During these breaks between 
sessions, data were collected as described in 
Experiment 1. 
A non-concurrent multiple-baseline de-
sign was used in which the number of base-
line sessions varied between 3 and 6 with ex-
act number of sessions contingent upon per-
formance stability for each participant.  Dur-
ing baseline, participants were instructed that 
they could ask questions regarding interacting 
with the game interface, but that any ques-
tions regarding strategy would not be ans-
wered.  Baseline continued until stable res-
ponding of correct play was observed, with 
stability defined as 3 of 4 consecutive ses-
sions with Percentage Correct Play within a 
range of 10% observed. 
Upon completion of baseline, perfor-
mance feedback was instated to train partici-
pants for correct play.  Training consisted of 
the introduction of a warning pop-up box that 
would appear on the computer screen inform-
ing participants of an error in their play (after 
desired cards were held and/or discarded) and 
the overall cost of the current error on their 
long run financial return.  This pop-up warn-
ing did not inform participants of what the 
correct play would be; however, it did give 
them the option of playing the hand as cur-
rently chosen or to go back and change the 
cards currently held.  Participants were in-
structed to always choose to go back and 
change the cards held, and that if in 5 at-
tempts at determining the correct play, they 
were unsuccessful, that they could ask the ex-
perimenter for feedback regarding the correct 
play.  When necessary, this personalized 
feedback consisted of a description of the cor-
rect cards to hold and discard based on the 
payout table for the chosen game.  Perfor-
mance feedback continued until two consecu-
tive sessions were observed with percent cor-
rect responding being 20% or greater over the 
mean of the last 3 baseline sessions’ percen-
tage. 
If participants displayed more than 2 con-
secutive data points with no increase over 
baseline performance, an advanced-training 
component consisting of prompts on every 
trial during the next session was instituted.  
For this advanced training the experimenter 
sat with the participant and explained the
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Figure 1.  Displays the performance of the eleven participants of Experiment 2.  Each partic-
ipant was initially allowed to play Deuces Wild Poker without any feedback, followed by the 
performance feedback intervention, and eventually a follow-up condition. 
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correct play based on the cards dealt and the 
payout table for the given game for each hand 
played.  These prompted sessions continued 
until a session with percent correct respond-
ing of greater than 20% over the mean of the 
last three baseline data points was observed.  
Once this criterion was reached, regular train-
ing conditions were reinstated. 
Following each participant’s attainment 
of the training criterion increase over base-
line, they completed a follow-up phase under 
the same parameters as baseline.  No feed-
back of any kind was given and participants 
were instructed that they once again could not 
ask questions regarding playing strategy.  Par-
ticipants were informed that if their fell back 
to baseline levels they would have to repeat 
training.  A criteria of no more than two ob-
servations with percent correct responding 
less than 10% over the mean of the last three 
baseline points was in place during follow up, 
though no participant failed to maintain res-
ponding over baseline levels.  Follow up con-
tinued for a minimum of three data points.   
 
EXPERIMENT 2 
RESULTS AND DISCUSSION 
Figure 1 displays the performance of the 
11 participants in Experiment 2.  Baseline da-
ta indicate that many errors were made during 
every session.  In other words, accurate play 
of optimal poker cards held and discarded was 
rather low.  No participant achieved a Percent 
Correct Play over 75% during any session, 
with the lowest observed accuracy being less 
than 10%.  Nonetheless, upon introduction of 
the performance feedback intervention, error 
percentages declined dramatically with a con-
comitant increase in percentage correct play.  
All 11 participants improved performance 
over baseline and all 11 maintained these per-
formance gains after the removal of the feed-
back.   No session during follow-up revealed 
less than 75% percentage correct play in any 
session for any participant. 
 
GENERAL DISCUSSION 
Taken together, the results from the 
present two experiments suggest that recrea-
tional gamblers who play video poker do in 
fact make a substantial amount of errors.  The 
type of game played can impact the rate of 
errors, and performance feedback can im-
prove performance.  Errors cost the player 
money, as non-optimal play results in more 
losing hands at poker than need be if the hand 
is played more accurately.  When a degree of 
skill is necessary to “win” at a gamble, it is 
advantageous to develop those skills as best 
possible.  Performance feedback has yielded 
utility to improve skills in many areas (e.g., 
Kladopoulos & McComas, 2001; Mellalieu, 
Hanton, & O’Brien, 2006; Smith & Ward, 
2006) outside of gambling, and the present 
results suggest that such feedback can benefit 
the recreational gambler.   
A potential limitation of the present study 
is that it cannot conclude error reduction will 
result in a smaller amount of money being 
spent at a casino.  In fact, teaching someone 
to play better may only produce a player that 
plays longer in duration, as the same amount 
of money will simply go further.  Future re-
search should explore length of play, level of 
risk taken, and resistance to extinction follow-
ing performance feedback training similar to 
that of the present study.  Finally, experiments 
such as the present may in fact pose a risk to 
participants that could eventually develop 
more severe gambling behavior after exposure 
to an intervention that taught them to play 
“better.”  It may be possible that a participant 
could develop a self-rule such as “I now know 
how to beat the house, I will become a millio-
naire” as suggested by Zlomke and Dixon 
(2006).   Caution should be taken to debrief 
participants and assure them that the odds will 
never be in their favor, not even for the most 
error-free video poker player.  Many public 
campaigns are designed to teach people edu-
cated ways to consume alcohol (i.e., in mod-
eration and not while driving).  Perhaps simi-
54 MARK R. DIXON and JAMES W. JACKSON  
lar attention should be paid to persons with no 
known pathologies for gambling, that through 
a lack of education pay more than necessary 
for their recreational pastime.     
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